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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON TAX AVOIDANCE, MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
GIULIA ZILIO 
AUGUST 2017 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace.  
Major Department: Economics.   
This dissertation consists of three distinct essays on tax avoidance, monetary policy and 
international trade.  
The first chapter focuses on profit shifting. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate 
the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer prices) to shift profits to 
countries with more favorable tax treatments. I improve upon the current practice to estimating 
this elasticity by constructing a measure of the stringency with which countries enforce their 
anti-tax avoidance rules and take into account their incentive to enforce them. I report evidence 
showing that the failure to account for the enforcement of anti-tax avoidance rules and the 
incentive to enforce them results not only in biased estimates of the semi-elasticity of 
reported profits with respect to CIT-rate but also results in a misspecified empirical model. I 
estimate the empirical model of reported profits using detailed annual data on more than 40,000 
affiliates located in 28 countries during the period from 2008 to 2014.  
The second chapter I conduct an event study to first examine the role of macroeconomic 
news surprises on monetary policy expectations; second, I estimate the effect that changes in 
short and long-term monetary policy expectations have on financial markets on days of 
macroeconomic news announcements compared to days of federal open market committee 
(FOMC) announcements. Factor analysis is used to build a short and a long-term measure of 
monetary policy expectations using federal funds futures and Eurodollar futures. I 
conclude that the path and the target factors are both affected by several macroeconomic news 
surprises.   
Finally in the last chapter I use a stochastic general equilibrium, two-country model of 
trade and macroeconomic dynamics developed by Ghironi & Melitz (2005) to assess the effect of 
two exogenous shocks: a negative technology shock to China’s productivity and a trade policy 
shock that makes exporting to China less costly and importing from China more expensive 
(known as the border-adjustment tax). I find that a negative productivity shock in China results 
in a reduction of imports from China and an increase in the entry of firms in the United States. At 
the contrary, a trade policy shock in the United States leaves American (Chinese) consumers 
slightly worst (better) off.  
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1 
Introduction  
My dissertation is divided in three different chapters: “Cross-Country Differences in 
Corporate Tax Rates, Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules, and Base Erosion Profit Shifting”, “Does 
Macroeconomic News Affect Monetary Policy Expectations and Asset Prices? Evidence from 
Event Studies” and “The Impact of China’s Economic Slowdown and United States’  New Trade 
Policy on both the United States and China”.  
In the first chapter I look at how Cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT) 
rates create incentives for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to manipulate the prices that they 
use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer prices) to shift profits to countries with 
more favorable tax treatments. Such behavior reduces the aggregate tax burden of an MNE thus 
increasing its worldwide after-tax profits, which presumably increases stockholder value. 
However, this behavior also erodes the CIT bases of countries, like the United States and other 
OECD countries, with relatively high CIT rates. To mitigate such behavior, governments adopt 
and enforce anti-tax avoidance rules. In this paper, I seek to gauge the effect on profit shifting of 
CIT-rate differentials among countries. I improve upon the current practice to estimating this 
elasticity by constructing a measure of the stringency with which countries enforce their anti-tax 
avoidance rules and take into account their incentive to enforce them. I report evidence showing 
that the failure to account for the enforcement of anti-tax avoidance rules and the incentive to 
enforce them results not only in biased estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits with 
respect to CIT-rate but also results in a misspecified empirical model. I estimate the empirical 
model of reported profits using detailed annual data on more than 40,000 affiliates located in 28 
countries during the period from 2008 to 2014. To illustrate the practical consequences for tax 
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policy analysis of correctly specifying the empirical model, I conduct a policy simulation in 
which the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percent.  
 The second chaper focuses on monetary polices and central bank annuncements. Interest 
rates have played a crucial role in the latest global financial crisis. Financial investors closely 
follow macroeconomic news announcements in order to predict central banks’ monetary policies, 
which indirectly affect interest rates. In this paper, I first examine the role of macroeconomic 
news surprises (specifically those related to the labor market, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer 
confidence, retail sales and new home sales) on monetary policy expectations; second, I estimate 
the effect that changes in short and long-term monetary policy expectations have on financial 
markets on days of macroeconomic news announcements compared to days of federal open 
market committee (FOMC) announcements. Factor analysis is used to build a short- (target 
factor) and a long-term (path factor) measure of monetary policy expectations using federal 
funds futures and Eurodollar futures. Finally, after performing several event studies using United 
States financial data from 1998 to 2014, I conclude that the path and the target factors are both 
affected by several macroeconomic news surprises; investor’s expectations of monetary policies 
are also impacted by positive and negative macroeconomic news announcements; financial 
markets’ reactions to monetary policy expectations are larger in absolute value on days of 
numerous macroeconomic indicators announcements compared to days of FOMC 
announcements. Focusing on the latest financial crisis, I report evidence that investor’s short-
term monetary policy expectations are not affected by unexpected changes in macroeconomic 
indicators.  
The last and third chapter looks at numerous international trade dynamics between China 
and the United States. In recent years, large emerging markets have accounted for the majority of 
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the growth of global demand. China is the largest of these fast growing emerging economies and 
the second largest economy in the world. For nearly two decades, China has been on the list of 
top ten U.S. trading partners. It is by far the United States' largest source of imported goods as 
well as an increasingly important destination for U.S.-made products. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that financial markets and policy makers in the United States closely follow news 
related to China. In this paper, I use a stochastic general equilibrium, two-country model of trade 
and macroeconomic dynamics developed by Ghironi & Melitz (2005) to assess the effect of two 
exogenous shocks. First, a negative technology shock to China’s productivity and second, a trade 
policy shock that makes exporting to China less costly and importing from China more 
expensive (known as the border-adjustment tax). In this model, an exogenous shock to aggregate 
productivity or to trade costs induces firms to enter and exit, thus altering the composition of 
businesses. This in turn effects wages and the price and type of goods available to consumers in 
each country. I find that a negative productivity shock in China results in a reduction of imports 
from China and an increase in the entry of firms in the United States. While the labor market in 
the United States benefits from this shock via an increase in wages, American consumers lose 
due to their being less variation in the type of goods available and the increase in prices. At the 
contrary, a trade policy shock in the United States (specifically, a tariff on imports and a subsidy 
on exports) leaves American (Chinese) consumers slightly worst (better) off. This latter policy 
also results in an increase (decrease) in the total number of firms in the United States (China). 
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Chapter I: Cross-Country Differences in Corporate Tax Rates, Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules, 
and Base Erosion Profit Shifting 
1. Introduction 
Policy-makers and the public alike are paying increasing attention to issues involving 
international taxation because, among other reasons, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are using 
increasingly sophisticated tax planning strategies to minimize their worldwide tax liabilities. For 
example, cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT) rates create incentives for 
MNEs to manipulate the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer 
prices) to shift profits to countries with more favorable tax treatments. Doing so, without 
detection by the tax authorities, decreases the MNE’s aggregate CIT liabilities and increases its 
worldwide after-tax profits which, presumably, increases shareholder value. However, such 
behavior by MNEs erodes the tax bases of countries, like the United States and other OECD 
countries, with relatively high CIT rates. Clausing (2015) estimates that the United States lost 
$111 billion in federal CIT revenue in 2012 due to the illegal shifting by U.S.-based MNEs of 
$371 billion of corporate profits to foreign affiliates. 
Generally speaking, a country has two policy options at its disposal to deter so-called 
base erosion profit shifting (BEPS) by MNEs. They can cut the CIT rate and/or adopt and 
enforce anti-tax avoidance regulations. Cutting the CIT rate to deter BEPS can be likened to 
international tax competition to attract mobile capital. The he risk of countries cutting CIT rates 
is that it will lead to a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ where governments repeatedly cut CIT rates in 
response to the tax cuts of other countries in a repeated game of ‘tit-for-tat’. 
The existing literature on BEPS (Hines Jr & Rice, 1994; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008; 
Lohse & Riedel, 2013), henceforth HR, HL, and LR, respectively, generally focuses on 
estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to CIT tax-rate differentials among 
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countries (henceforth referred to simply as the semi-elasticity of reported profits).1 At this point, 
the alert reader may very well be puzzled. How does the semi-elasticity of reported profits allow 
tax policy analyst to conclude anything about the effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries 
on BEPS? The relationship between reported profits and BEPS is relatively straightforward. In 
contrast to reported profits, which is observable, the true profits and the amount of tax motivated 
profit shifting by an MNE’s affiliate is not observable. However, the reported profit of an MNE’s 
affiliate is equal to its true profit minus the net amount of outbound profit shifting, which may be 
positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE, minus the cost to the 
affiliate of engaging in intracompany transactions to shift profits to a foreign affiliate. In other 
words, the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate is a negative function of the net amount of 
outbound profit shifting in response to cross-country differences in CIT rates. This relationship 
allows us to infer the effect of CIT-rate differentials on BEPS from the semi-elasticity of 
reported profits. This explains why the literature has settled upon this approach. 
In this paper, I show that the current ‘state-of-the-art’- empirical models of reported 
profits not only result in biased estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits, but are also 
misspecified. First, existing studies fail to account for the stringency with which countries 
enforce their transfer-pricing rules. Yet, countries with relatively high CIT rates are more likely 
to adopt and more stringently enforce transfer-pricing rules to mitigate BEPS. Therefore, 
empirical models of reported profits which do not control for the stringency with which countries 
enforce their anti-tax avoidance rules may result in inconsistent estimates of the semi-elasticity 
                                                          
1
 I estimate a semi-log specification of a model of reported profits. A semi-elasticity gives the percentage change in 
the dependent variable in terms of a change of the dependent variable. Algebraically, the semi-elasticity S of a 
function f at point x is. More specifically, the dependent variable in a semi-log specification of the model is the 
natural logarithm of an affiliate’s reported profits and, on the right-hand-side of the regression equation, is the 
simple difference in the maximum statutory CIT rate of the host country of the affiliate and that of the host country 
of the MNE’s ultimate owner. As a result, the estimated coefficient of the CIT-rate differential is a semi-elasticity 
rather than an elasticity which is the interpretation given to the estimated coefficient in a double-log specification 
(Olsen & Osmundsen, 2003).  
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of reported profits due to omitted variable bias. To be fair, existing approaches to estimating the 
semi-elasticity of reported profits do include controls for the adoption of anti-tax avoidance 
regulations, particularly transfer-pricing rules, by countries over time. However, adopting 
transfer-pricing rules is necessary but not sufficient to mitigate BEPS. A country must also 
enforce its rules and apply penalties for detected violations by domestic affiliates of MNEs to 
deter BEPS.  
The second reason that existing practice may result in biased estimates of the semi-
elasticity of reported profits is that the CIT-rate differential is potentially endogenous because of 
international tax competition among countries aimed at stemming BEPS. Again, there are a few 
studies that use instrumental variables to estimate their models of reported profits (Hines Jr & 
Rice, 1994; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008); however, the overwhelming majority of studies do not 
appear to address this issue in the estimation of their models of reported profits.  
Third, and certainly most seriously, researchers have not accounted for the incentives of 
countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules in the specification of their empirical models of 
reported profits. More specifically, a country seeking to mitigate BEPS should only monitor the 
transfer-pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaged in intracompany transactions 
involving foreign affiliates located in countries with lower CIT rates than its own. Since a 
country’s tax administration must use scarce resources to enforce transfer-pricing rules, countries 
should not monitor the transfer pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in 
intracompany transactions involving the foreign affiliates located in countries with higher CIT 
rates than its own. In this case, the domestic affiliate has no incentive to shift profits to the 
foreign affiliate; to do so would increase the aggregate tax burden of the MNE. More 
specifically, countries with high CIT rates should use scarce administrative resources to monitor 
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the transfer pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany 
transactions with foreign affiliates located in low CIT-rate countries. And, researchers striving to 
provide consistent estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits should take these incentives 
into account when specifying and estimating an empirical model of reported profits.  
To address these three concerns, I construct a dummy variable for the stringency with 
which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules. The enforcement dummy variable reflects 
both the level of transfer-pricing documentation that a country requires domestic affiliates of 
MNEs to submit with its annual CIT return, and the frequency with which the host country 
applies penalties for violations of its transfer-pricing rules. In constructing the enforcement 
dummy variable for a given country, the specification of the model accounts for whether the 
incentives facing the domestic affiliate of the MNE and thus whether the host country should 
monitor the affiliate’s transfer-pricing practices. As discussed in greater detail below, I show that 
the functional form of the empirical model must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the 
estimation of potentially three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits. 
In this paper, I develop a theoretical model of tax motivated profit shifting which also 
accounts for the incentives of countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules. The comparative 
statics of the model show that there are potentially three distinct semi-elasticities of reported 
profits with respect to CIT-rate differentials among countries. Based on this finding, I specify an 
empirical model of reported profits, which is sufficiently flexible to permit the simultaneous 
estimation of these three semi-elasticities of reported profits. Specifically, I estimate a semi-
elasticity of reported profits when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit shifting 
because the host country of the MNE’s subsidiary (ultimate owner) has a greater CIT-rate than 
the host-country of the MNE’s ultimate owner (subsidiary). This accounts for two of the three 
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semi-elasticities of reported profits. I estimate a third semi-elasticity of reported profits for the 
case in which neither country has adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them.  
Following the existing literature, I estimate my model of reported profits using detailed 
firm-level data for the period 2008 to 2014. In contrast to the sample periods used in previous 
studies, my sample period spans the Great Recession.2 The sample, which is constructed from 
the Orbis database, contains information on 43,103 affiliates located in 28 countries. Since the 
sample includes affiliates with ultimate owners located in a variety of developing, developed, 
and tax haven countries, there is considerable heterogeneity in the combinations of CIT-rate 
differentials and transfer-pricing enforcement regimes in my sample. This variation should be 
helpful in identifying the parameter estimates of the model. Using this sample, I estimate a firm-
level, instrumental variables, fixed-effects, panel-data model of reported profits to gauge the 
effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries on reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate. 
My preferred estimate, when countries enforce their transfer-pricing rules, is -3.2 (-1.0) 
for the semi-elasticity of reported profits when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit 
shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -3.2 implies that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate 
differential results in a 32 percent decrease in an affiliates’ reported profits due to outbound 
profit shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -1.0 implies that a 10 percent decrease in the 
CIT-rate differential results in a 10 percent increase in an affiliates’ reported profits due to 
inbound profit shifting. My preferred estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profit when 
neither country has adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them is equal to -3.5, 
meaning that a ten percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in a 35 percent decrease in 
the affiliates’ reported profits. 
                                                          
2
 Orbis is Bureau van Dijk's flagship database of private and listed company information from around the world that 
emphases the ownership linkages among firms that belong to the same multinational enterprise. 
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Finally, to illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly 
specifying the empirical model of reported profits, I conduct a policy simulation. I assume the 
United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percentage points, which results in a proposed-law CIT 
rate of 15 percent. This is approximately equal to the median CIT rate of OECD countries. I use 
my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as a single estimate of 
the semi-elasticity obtained using a state-of-the-art but seriously misspecified model to conduct 
the policy simulation. This exercise shows that using consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities 
obtained from a correctly specified model has a substantial effect on the estimated CIT tax 
revenue effect of the proposed reform.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of a brief 
overview of the literature on estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits. In particular, I 
focus on those studies that control for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules by countries over 
time. Section 3 describes a simple theoretical model of tax motived profit shifting by MNEs and 
analyzes the comparative statics of the model. Section 4 describes the data and construction of 
the sample used to estimate the empirical model, the econometric specification of the model of 
profit shifting, and the construction of the variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. I 
report the results of the policy simulation in the subsequent section, and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to provide a comprehensive review of the vast 
literature on BEPS.3 Therefore, we proceed below by reviewing some of the seminal and most 
relevant papers in this literature.  
                                                          
3
 See Heckemeyer & Overessh (2013) and Dharmapala (2014) for up-to-date and excellent reviews of the literature 
on BEPS. 
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The literature on tax-motivated, international profit shifting focuses on gauging the effect 
of CIT-rate differentials on the reported profit of the affiliates of MNEs. Due to the large variety 
of methodologies, data, and sample periods used in this literature, it is difficult to compare 
estimates. Heckemeyer & Overesh (2013), however, seek to provide a consensus estimate of the 
semi-elasticity of reported profits by conducting a meta-analysis of the available estimates in the 
literature while controlling for the diversity of approaches. They report a consensus estimate of  
-0.8, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate differential among countries causes an 8 
percent decrease in the reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate. 
The literature on BEPS generally follows the practice introduced by HR. They assume 
that the true profit of an MNE’s affiliate is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
multiply by normalized prices, and subtracting production costs. They further assume that it is a 
function of capital, labor, and technological change. They use the natural logarithm of these 
variables as regressors in their empirical model to control for the true profits earned by the 
MNE’s affiliate in a given country. Using aggregate time-series data, HR and Gruber & Mutti 
(1991) report evidence of a decrease in the reported profits of subsidiaries located in countries 
with high CIT rates. In addition to not accounting for the enforcement of anti-tax avoidance 
rules, they do not account for the role of CIT rates in other countries in which an MNE has a 
presence.  
To address the latter issue, HL estimate a model of reported profits using a 1999 cross-
section of firm-level data for 12 European countries. They use the weighted-average (by the size 
of the affiliate) CIT rates of countries in which an MNE has a presence to calculate the CIT-rate 
differential facing an MNE’s affiliate. They report an estimated semi-elasticity of reported 
profits with respect to the weighted-average, CIT-rate differential of -1.3. (Dischinger, Knoll, & 
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Riedel, 2014; Lohse & Riedel, 2013) also report evidence consistent with BEPS by MNEs. They 
show that reported profits are greater (less) than predicted for affiliates located in countries with 
relatively low (high) CIT rates.  
To their credit, Dharmapala & Riedel (2013) and LR make an important methodological 
contribution to specification of models of reported profit by including a control variable for the 
existence of transfer-pricing rules by country and over time. As previously discussed, however, 
the mere existence of transfer-pricing rules is necessary but not sufficient to deter BEPS. 
Countries must also enforce their anti-tax avoidance regulations if they are going to have a 
deterrent effect on the tax planning strategies of MNEs. Since I contend that the stringency with 
which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules plays an important role in correctly specifying 
a model of reported profits and consistently estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits, I 
proceed below by carefully describing the approaches used in the literature to control for 
transfer-pricing rules by country and over time. 
Although Bartelsman & Beetsma (2003) do not focus on the effect of transfer-pricing 
rules on BEPS, they do introduce a control variable for transfer-pricing rules as a robustness 
check of their estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. They do so by constructing an 
index of transfer-pricing rules for each country in their sample based on the following three 
criteria: (1) a country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules; (2) the country requires domestic 
affiliates of MNEs to provide transfer-pricing documentation with its annual CIT return; and (3) 
the country’s adoption of penalties for violating transfer-pricing rules. They estimate their model 
of reported profits using a sample of 16 countries. As expected, they report evidence that the 
responsiveness of reported value added to CIT-rate differentials among countries is stronger for 
observations in countries with less stringent rules than it is for observations located in countries 
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with more stringent rules. The potential limitations of this approach are twofold. First, their 
estimate may not be identified because of the limited number of countries in their sample which 
may result in a lack of sufficient variation in the index of transfer-pricing rules. Second, and 
more importantly, their control variable for the existence of transfer-pricing rules does not 
account for whether countries are actually assessing penalties on domestic affiliates of MNEs for 
violations of their transfer-pricing rules. 
Lohrse & Riedel (2012, 2013) also include an index for transfer-pricing rules based on a 
country’s documentation requirements. In their specification of the econometric model, they 
include an interaction term between the index for the existence of transfer-pricing rules and the 
CIT-rate differential among countries. This allows the estimate of semi-elasticity of reported 
profits to differ for affiliates of MNEs located in countries with documentation requirements and 
for those located in countries without such requirements. They conclude that transfer-pricing 
regulations are an important strategy for governments seeking to deter BEPS. However, they also 
do not account for whether countries actually enforce for their transfer-pricing rules.  
Klessen & Laplante (2012) look deeply into the interaction between the regulatory costs 
to an MNE’s affiliate of the “enforcement” of transfer-pricing rules and a proxy variable for 
income shifting. They estimate their model using a sample of MNEs located in the United States. 
Their measure of enforcement is the IRS audit rate for large corporations. This is arguably an 
imprecise measure of the enforcement of transfer-pricing rules. As a proxy for regulatory costs, 
they use the weighted average of the existence and enforcement of transfer-pricing rules among 
the major trading partners of the United States. They conclude that U.S. companies are becoming 
more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have 
changed over time. 
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Beer & Loeprick (2013) study the effect of the introduction of transfer-pricing rules on 
the  time path of reported profits. They find that within four years of introducing a rule requiring 
transfer-pricing documentation to be submitted with an MNE’s annual CIT return, the reported 
profits of a subsidiary decreases by approximately 60 percent. Theirs is an innovative way of 
thinking about the regulator costs of transfer-pricing rules. At the risk of being repetitive, their 
econometric specification does not include a control variable for whether a country actually 
enforces its documentation requirements. 
The present research makes the following contributions to the literature on BEPS. First, 
my econometric specification includes a control variable that accounts for the enforcement of 
transfer-pricing rules. This variable was painfully constructed using information gleaned from 
reviewing hundreds of reports issued by KPMG and Ernst & Young. Second, in constructing the 
enforcement dummy variable, I account for the incentives of the host country to enforce its 
transfer-pricing rules vis-à-vis a foreign affiliate of the MNE based on the prevailing CIT-rate 
differential between those the host countries. In constructing the enforcement dummy variable, I 
use the rules of the ultimate owner’s host country when that country’s top statutory CIT rate is 
greater than that of the foreign subsidiary’s host country and, vice versa, I use the rules of the 
foreign subsidiary’s host country when that country has a top statutory CIT rate that is greater 
than that of the ultimate owner’s host country. The rationale for constructing the enforcement 
dummy variable in this manner is straightforward: countries should only monitor the transfer-
pricing practices when a domestic affiliate of an MNE is engaging in intracompany transactions 
with a foreign affiliate located in a country with a lower CIT rate than its own. When a domestic 
affiliate’s host country has a lower CIT rate than that for the foreign affiliate’s host country, 
there is simply no risk of BEPS.  
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Third, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the theory, the specification of my 
empirical model is sufficiently flexible to allow for the simultaneous estimation of three separate 
semi-elasticities of reported profit. Fourth, the sample used to estimate the model includes a 
larger number of countries, including developing, developed, and tax haven countries, than those 
used in previous studies. Consequently, there is likely to be greater heterogeneity in the sample 
in terms of the combinations of CIT-rate differentials among countries and the values of the 
enforcement dummy variable used in this study. The added variation among the independent 
variables should be helpful in identifying estimated parameters of the model. Fifth, I estimate an 
instrument variables model to address the potential endogeneity of the CIT-rate differentials 
among countries in my sample. 
3. A simple model of tax motivated profit shifting by an MNE 
In this section, we describe a simple model of tax-motivated, international profit shifting of an 
MNE and derive the comparative statics of the model. The comparative static results of the 
model are useful in guiding the specification of the empirical model and also provide an entirely 
new set of testable hypotheses that are an important focus of the econometric exercise discussed 
in the subsequent section of this study. 
3.1. Theoretical model  
A fundamental concept in this section is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate, which 
is defined as follows: 
 
π୎ୖ = π୎୘ − S୨ − γ୨ʹ S୨ଶπ୨୘ (1) 
Where ߨ௝ோ is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate j (= 1,…, n) located in country J (= 1,…, 
n); tJ is the CIT rate of country J; ߨ௝்  is the true profit earned by the MNE in country J; Sj is the 
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net amount of outbound profit shifting by the MNE’s affiliate j; and ߛ𝐽 ௝ܵଶ ʹߨ௝்⁄  is the total cost to 
affiliate j of engaging in intracompany transactions to illegally shift profits to a foreign affiliate. 
These costs are assumed to be increasing in the stringency with which country J enforces its anti-
tax avoidance rules, which is denoted by ȖJ. This policy parameter is assumed to be greater than 
or equal to zero. As discussed in greater detail below, I assume that ȖJ = 0, when country J has no 
incentive to enforce its transfer-pricing rules (because it is receiving revenue from the foreign 
affiliate). In addition, the total costs of engaging in illegal profit shifting to a foreign affiliate is a 
positive function of the ratio of the square of the net amount of outbound profit shifting and the 
true profit of the MNE’s affiliate j. The quadratic specification of the cost function captures the 
assumption that the costs to the affiliate increase with the square of the net amount of illegal 
outbound profit shifting. 
Following HR and HL, we assume that an MNE seeks to maximize worldwide after-tax 
profits subject to the constraint that the sum of net outbound profit-shifting by all n affiliates of 
the MNE is equal to zero. Furthermore, I assume an affiliate’s net outbound profit shifting may 
be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE in particular countries. 
The resulting constrained optimization problem can be written as follows: 
 
max V = ∑(ͳ − ݐ𝐽)π୨ୖ୬୨=ଵ = ∑(ͳ − t୎)୬୨=ଵ ቆπ୎୘ − S୨ − γ୨ʹ S୨ଶπ୨୘ቇ, 
subject to ∑ ௝ܵ = Ͳ௡௝=ଵ . 
 
(2) 
To simplify the model, we assume that the MNE only has two affiliates: a foreign 
affiliate g located in country G, and an affiliate h located in the MNE’s home country H. The 
Lagrange expression for (2) is given by the following expression: 
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L = ሺͳ − tୋሻ ( ߨ݃ܶ − ?ܵ? − ߛʹܩ ܵ݃ʹߨ݃ܶ ) + ሺͳ − tୌሻ ( ߨℎܶ − ܵℎ − ߛʹܪ ܵℎʹߨℎܶ  ) − 𝜆( ?ܵ? + ܵℎ). (3) 
Where λ is a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint that the sum of Sj must equal zero; tJ is the 
CIT rate of country J (= G, H); ߨ௝் is the true profit of affiliate j (= g or h) earned in country J (= 
G or H, respectively); and Sj is the net amount of outbound profits being illegally shifted abroad 
by affiliate j (= g or h).  
Without loss of generality, we assume that the CIT rate of country G is greater than that 
of country H or tG – tH > 0. Given the tax incentives created by (tG – tH) > 0, the MNE should 
seek to shift profits from the foreign affiliate g to the home affiliate h. This action by the MNE 
will increase country H’s CIT base and consequently its CIT revenues. Given these 
circumstances, country H has no incentive to spend scarce administrative resources monitoring 
the transfer pricing practices of a domestic affiliate in so far as it is engaging in intracompany 
transactions with the foreign affiliate g. There is simply no risk that the domestic affiliate h will 
seek to shift profits to the foreign affiliate by strategically using transfer prices to understate the 
true profit earned in country H. If, however, affiliate g is engaging in intracompany transactions 
with affiliate h, country G should monitor affiliate g’s transfer-pricing practices to deter BEPS. 
Therefore, we assume ߛீ > 0 and ߛு = 0. 
The necessary first order conditions for a maximum are given as follows:  
 
ఋ𝐿ఋௌ𝑖 = −ሺͳ − t୍ሻ (ͳ + ఊ಺ௌ𝑖 𝜋𝑖𝑇 ) =  𝜆. (4) 
Where i = g or h, and I = G or H. Solving these two equations simultaneously for affiliate g’s 
optimal level of outbound profit shifting results in the following expression: 
 
        ?ܵ?∗ = ௧ಸ−௧ಹఊಸ ( 𝜋𝑔𝑇ሺଵ−௧ಸሻ )  (5) 
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The signs of the expressions on the right-hand-side of (5) implies that  ?ܵ?∗ > 0, meaning that 
affiliate g should shift profits to affiliate h. This in turn implies that affiliate g’s reported profits 
will be less than the true profits earned in country G. Finally, the constraint Sg + Sh = 0 implies 
that  ܵℎ∗ = − ?ܵ?∗ < 0, meaning that affiliate h is receiving inbound profit shifting, which, in turn, 
implies its reported profits are greater than the true profits earned in country H. According to (5), 
affiliate g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting is positively related to tG – tH, inversely 
related to ȖG, and independent of ȖH.  
Differentiating (5) by the policy parameters available to country G to deter BEPS, 
specifically tG – tH and ȖG, results in the following two expressions: 
 
 ∂ୗg∗∂ሺtృ−tౄሻ =  πgTγృሺଵ − tృሻ > Ͳ and (6) 
 
 ∂Sg∗∂γୋ = − πg୘ሺtୋ − tୌሻγୋଶ ሺͳ − tୋሻ < Ͳ. (7) 
From (6), there is a positive relationship between the CIT-rate differential tG – tH and affiliate g’s 
optimal level of outbound profit shifting, and (6) implies that there is a negative relationship 
between the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules ȖG and affiliate 
g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting. 
As previously discussed, the amount of illegal profit shifting among affiliates of an MNE 
is not observable; therefore, (6) and (7) are difficult to test empirically. Since an affiliate’s 
reported profits are observable, we recast the comparative static results derived above in terms of 
the effect of G’s policy parameters on affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits. Substituting 
(5) into (1) and differentiating the resulting expression by the policy parameters available to G to 
mitigate BEPS, we obtain the following expressions:4 
                                                          
4
 Substituting (5) into (1) results in the following expression for affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits: 
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 ߲ߨ𝑔ோ∗߲ሺݐீ − ݐுሻ = − ቆ ߨ𝑔ߛீሺͳ − ݐீሻ + ߨ𝑔  ሺݐீ − ݐுሻߛீሺͳ − ݐீሻଶ ቇ < Ͳ, (8) 
 
 ߲ߨ𝑔ோ∗߲ߛீ = ቆߨ𝑔  ሺݐீ − ݐுሻଶʹߛீଶሺͳ − ݐீሻ + ߨ𝑔 ሺݐீ − ݐுሻߛீଶሺͳ − ݐீሻቇ  > Ͳ , and (9) 
 
 𝜕మ𝜋𝑔𝑅∗𝜕ሺ௧ಸ−௧ಹሻ𝜕ఊಸ = ( 𝜋𝑔𝑇ఊಸమሺଵ−௧ಸሻ + 𝜋𝑔𝑇 ሺ௧ಸ−௧ಹሻఊಸమሺଵ−௧ಸሻమ )  > Ͳ. (10) 
From (8), there is an inverse relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits 
and the CIT-rate differential; (9) shows a positive relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level 
of reported profits and the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules. 
Finally, (10) implies that increasing the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-
pricing rules decreases (in absolute value) the effect of the CIT-rate differential on affiliate g’s 
optimal level of reported profits. In other words, increasing the stringency with which a country 
enforces its transfer-pricing rules deters BEPS for every positive value of the CIT-rate 
differential between countries G and H. 
A graph illustrating the implications of (8) - (10) for the relationships between affiliate 
g’s optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential may help in understanding the 
comparative static results of this model. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between affiliate g’s 
optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential. As we will see, the relationships 
crucially depend on the stringency with which country G (H) enforces its transfer-pricing rules.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 ߨ𝑔ோ∗ =  ߨ𝑔 [ͳ − ሺ௧ಸ−௧ಹሻఊಸሺభ−𝑡ಸሻ − ሺ௧ಸ−௧ಹሻమଶሺͳ−ݐܩሻమఊಸ]. 
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Figure 1: The Optimal Reported Profits of Affiliate g with Respect to the Corporate Income Tax 
Rate Differential between Countries G and H 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The slope of the line segment labelled ܥܦ̅̅ ̅̅  corresponds to ߚଵ in the econometric specification (10), 
when ߛீ = ߛு = Ͳ. The slope of the line segment labelled ܶܨ̅̅̅̅  is corresponds to ߚଵ + ߚଶ in the 
econometric specification (10), when ߛீ > Ͳ and ߛு = Ͳ. The slope of the line segment labeled ܧܶ̅̅̅̅  
corresponds to ߚଵ + ߚଷ in the econometric specification, when ߛீ = Ͳ and ߛு = Ͳ.  
 
The vertical axis of Figure 1 represents affiliate g’s reported profit ߨ𝑔ோ∗and the horizontal 
axis represents the CIT-rate differential between countries G and H, which is denoted by (tG – 
tH). The CIT-rate differential can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero. When the CIT-rate 
differential is equal to zero, there is no incentive for either affiliate to shift profits to the other; 
therefore, affiliate g’s reported profits are equal to its true profits when tG = tH. This point is 
labeled T on the vertical axis of Figure 1. Furthermore, if the reported profits of the affiliates are 
independent of the CIT-rate differential, then affiliate g’s reported profits would always be equal 
to its true profits. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that affiliate g’s true profit is exogeneous 
tG – tH 
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(i.e., independent of the CIT-rate differential), then affiliate g’s reported profit would equal its 
true profit for every value of (tG – tH). This case is illustrated by the horizontal line and labeled ܣܤ̅̅ ̅̅  and passing through point T. This line provides a useful reference in following discussion. 
According to (8) – (10), we must analyze three distinct cases. First, let’s suppose neither 
country adopts transfer-pricing rules in which case ȖG = ȖH = 0. In this case, there is an inverse 
relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits and (tG – tH). This relationship 
is illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ܥܦ̅̅ ̅̅ . When (tG – tH)  < 0, 
then affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g in which case affiliate g’s 
reported profits are greater than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that that 
the negatively sloped line segment labeled ܥܶ̅̅̅̅ , which represents affiliate g’s reported profits, lies 
above the line labelled ܣܤ̅̅ ̅̅ , which represents affiliate g’s true profits. The vertical distance 
between ܥܶ̅̅̅̅  and  ܣܤ̅̅ ̅̅  represents affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting, which is 
equal to the amount of inbound profit shifting received by to affiliate g, for every value of (tG – 
tH) < 0.  
Now, let’s consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH > 0. In this situation, 
affiliate g has an incentive to shift profits to firm h, or ?ܵ?∗ > 0, and, as a result, the reported profits 
of affiliate g are less than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that the 
negatively sloped line segment labeled ܶܦ̅̅ ̅̅  , representing affiliate g’s optimal level of reported 
profits, lies below the horizontal line labelled ܣܤ̅̅ ̅̅  , representing the true profits of affiliate g, for 
every value of tG – tH > 0. The vertical distance between ܶܦ̅̅ ̅̅  and  ܣܤ̅̅ ̅̅  represents affiliate g’s 
optimal level of outbound profit shifting at every value of (tG – tH) > 0.  
For purposes of interpreting the empirical model, it is important to observe that the 
inverse relationship between affiliate g’s reported profits and its optimal level of net outbound 
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profit shifting, which can be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the 
MNE, is evident in Figure 1, as well. As we move from left to right along the horizontal axis, the 
CIT-rate differential is increasing; reported profits are decreasing; and affiliate g’s optimal 
amount of net outbound profit shifting is increasing. The negatively sloped line labeled ܥܦ̅̅ ̅̅  
illustrates (8) after setting ȖG = 0. 
Turning to the second case 2, consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH < 0. 
As previously discussed, affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g. 
Now, in contrast to the previous case, country H enforces its transfer-pricing rules to prevent 
BEPS. According to (10), enforcement decreases (in absolute value) outbound profit shifting by 
affiliate h, and, consequently, we assume ȖH > 0. The effect of country H enforcing its transfer-
pricing rules on the optimal level of inbound profits being received by g with respect to the CIT-
rate differential is illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ܧܶ ̅̅ ̅̅̅. This 
line segment is not as steeply sloped as the line labeled ܥܶ̅̅̅̅  because country H is enforcing its 
transfer-pricing rules. This has a deterrent effect on affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit 
shifting thus decreasing the amount of inbound profits received by affiliate g at every value of  tG 
– tH < 0. 
The third case arises when tG – tH > 0, and country G enforces its transfer pricing rules to 
deter BEPS, thus ȖG > 0. Again, according to (10) enforcement decreases (in absolute value) 
affiliate g’s optimal level of net outbound profit shifting at every value of tG – tH > 0. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ܶܨ̅̅̅̅ . Again, this line segment 
is not as steeply sloped as the line segment ܶܦ̅̅ ̅̅  because of the deterrent effect of country G 
enforcing its transfer-pricing rules on affiliate g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting. 
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I conclude this section with a couple of final observations. First, the line segment labeled ܧܨ̅̅ ̅̅  may not have a constant slope. Indeed, there should be a kink in ܧܨ̅̅ ̅̅   at the point labelled T 
on the vertical axis of Figure 1 if ȖG  ≠ ȖH, meaning that one country is enforcing its transfer-
pricing rules, when it has the incentive to do so, more stringently than the other country. 
Consequently, the functional form of the empirical model should be flexible enough to permit 
the simultaneous estimation of three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profit. Second, for 
expository reasons, I assume that true profits are exogenous. If, however, a country’s CIT rate 
distorts the real activity of domestic affiliates of MNEs, as seems likely, then this could be 
illustrated in Figure 1 by rotating the three lines counter-clockwise about the point labeled T on 
the vertical axis. This also shows the necessity of controlling for true profits in the empirical 
model. 
In this section, we describe the data and the construction of the sample used to estimate 
the empirical model, the econometric specification of the empirical model of reported profits, 
and the variable construction. 
3.2. The data and sample construction 
To estimate the model, I use firm-level data. Such data are not readily available. At the 
moment, there are only three government entities that collect information on MNEs: The Bureau 
of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Operations and Management Companies Database in the U.S., 
Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase on Direct Investments (MIDI), and the United 
Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics annual inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI). 
Unfortunately, these databases are not publicly available. Fortunately, some private institutions, 
such as Capital IQ (COMPUSTAT and Capital IQ Platform) and Bureau Van Dijk-BvD (Orbis 
and Amadeus), offer various platforms that contain information on company profits, costs, 
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performance, and other indicators. These datasets are frequently used by firms providing 
accounting services to MNEs and by tax enforcement authorities, such as the IRS to take one 
example. These data are often used by scholars interested in corporate finance and international 
tax issues and are frequently cited in the academic literature.  
I construct a sample of affiliates of MNEs from the Orbis (BvD) database which contains 
information on over 200 million private companies worldwide. One of the limitations of using 
these data for the task at hand is that ownership information is only available for the most recent 
year of the data. Indeed, when applying the match of the current year to prior years, it is possible 
to obtain mismatches between parents and subsidiary firms, particularly when there have been 
mergers and acquisitions during the intervening years. As noted in previous studies that use these 
data (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Dischinger et al., 2014; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), this is an 
unfortunate but unavoidable limitation of using these data. 5Since mergers and acquisitions are 
relatively infrequent events (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), particularly during the time period 
spanned by my sample, I believe that any bias resulting from using these data is relatively small. 
I construct the sample, which I use to estimate the model, from the Orbis database by 
excluding firms with the following characteristics: firms with subsidiaries, inactive firms, firms 
with losses, non-industrial firms (banks, hedge funds, foundations, insurance, public authorities, 
trustees, venture capital, and others), small firms as defined by Orbis and firms with an ultimate 
owner located in the same country.6 Ultimate owners are excluded from the sample to prevent 
perfect multicollinearity due to the adding-up constraint that profit-shifting must sum to zero. 
Loss-making firms are excluded from the sample because they are subject to specific accounting 
rules; incorporating these rules into the empirical model is beyond the scope of the current study. 
                                                          
5
 Fifty percent of the data available are lost due to these selection criteria.  
6
 Ultimate owners are excluded from the data set because the same semi-elasticity of BEPS is calculated using the 
differential between an affiliate of an MNE and its ultimate owner. 
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After applying these exclusion criteria to the dataset, the resulting sample consists of 48,309 
subsidiaries for the period 2008 to 2014. Tables 1 and 2 report the number subsidiaries and 
ultimate owners in the sample by country, respectively. I augment the firm-level data with 
country-level data drawn from a variety of sources, as discussed in greater detail below.  
 
Table 1: Number of affiliates in the sample by country 
Country Number of affiliates 
1. Australia 5 
2. Austria 895 
3. Belgium 2,959 
4. Britain 4,386 
5. Cyprus 39 
6. Czech 3,108 
7. Denmark 1,194 
8. Estonia 631 
9. Finland 886 
10. France 6,161 
11. Germany 3,584 
12. Hong Kong 5 
13. Iceland 14 
14. Ireland 743 
15. Italy 4,044 
16. Japan 156 
17. Luxembourg 40 
18. Netherlands 779 
19. New Zealand 725 
20. Norway 1,273 
21. Portugal 1,858 
22. Slovakia 1,892 
23. Slovenia 546 
24. South Korea 995 
25. Spain 3,838 
26. Sweden 2280 
27. Switzerland 46 
28. United States 21 
Total number of affiliates  43,103 
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Table 2: Host countries of the ultimate owners (in alphabetical order) 
Country Number 
of firms Country 
Number 
of firms Country 
Number 
of firms 
Andorra 10 Greece 42 Peru 1 
Angola 9 Guinea-Bissau 1 Philippines 3 
Argentina 13 Hong Kong 165 Poland 184 
Australia 490 Hungary 73 Portugal 255 
Austria 1,300 Iceland 52 Romania 26 
Bahamas 30 India 291 Russian Federation 102 
Bahrain 3 Indonesia 4 Saint Vincent 4 
Barbados 2 Ireland 504 Saudi Arabia 24 
Belarus 2 Israel 172 Serbia 10 
Belgium 1,058 Italy 1,825 Seychelles 21 
Bermuda 198 Japan 2,295 Singapore 174 
Bosnia 5 Korea, Republic of 231 Slovakia 87 
Brazil 60 Kuwait 24 Slovenia 40 
Bulgaria 31 Latvia 34 South Africa 50 
Canada 450 Lebanon 36 Spain 1,171 
Cayman Isl. 196 Liechtenstein 107 Sri Lanka 4 
Chile 18 Lithuania 43 Sweden 1,726 
China 319 Luxembourg 1626 Switzerland 1,961 
Colombia 14 Macedonia 1 Syria 1 
Costa Rica 2 Malaysia 58 Taiwan 142 
Croatia 47 Malta 104 Thailand 12 
Cyprus 287 Marshall Islands 17 Tunisia 10 
Czech Rep. 291 Mauritius 21 Turkey 73 
Denmark 1,281 Mexico 50 Ukraine 43 
Ecuador 1 Monaco 22 UAE 91 
Egypt 3 Morocco 8 United Kingdom 2,921 
Estonia 18 Namibia 1 United States 7,234 
Finland 777 Netherlands 1,992 Uruguay 3 
France 2,957 New Zealand 63 Venezuela 8 
Georgia 1 Norway 811 Viet Nam 2 
Germany 6,107 Panama 67 Total 43,103 
 
3.3. The econometric specification 
To test the predictions derived from the theoretical model, I adapt the econometric 
specification pioneered by HR and HL. More specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects, 
instrumental variables, panel data model: 
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ܮ݋݃ሺߨ𝑔௧௥ ሻ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵሺݐீ௧ − ݐு௧ሻ + ߚଶሺݐீ௧ − ݐு௧ሻߛீ௧ + ߚଷሺݐீ௧ − ݐு௧ሻߛு௧ + ߚସߛீ௧ + ߚହߛு௧ + ߚ଺ log(݇𝑔௧) + ߚ଻ log(݈𝑔௧) + ߚ଼ܮ݋݃ሺܽீ௧ሻ + ߚଽ߱ீ௧ + ∑ 𝜎ݏݐ + ݑ𝑔௧. 
 
(10) 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of affiliate g’s reported profits in country 
G and year t. The CIT-rate differential for countries G and H, respectively, in year t, is denoted 
by tGt - tHt, and, as discussed in greater detail below, ߛீ௧  and ߛு௧ are dummy variables reflecting 
the stringency with which countries G and H, respectively, enforce their transfer-pricing rules 
while also accounting for their incentives to do so. The interaction terms involving the CIT-rate 
differential and the enforcement dummy variables provide the necessary flexibility to estimate 
the three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits predicted by the theory.  
The right-hand-side variables kgt and lgt, denote the value of firm g’s capital assets and 
labor costs, respectively. The variable aGt denotes country G’s real GDP per capita, which serves 
as a proxy variable for the rate of technological change. Following the methodology pioneered 
by HR, these variables are included in the model to control for the true profit earned by affiliate 
g in country G. The variable ωGt is a vector of country and time specific characteristics, namely 
indexes of trade freedom and political stability; ϭst is an industry-year fixed effect; and ugt is a 
stochastic-error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant 
variance. 
The model is estimated using an instrumental variable for the potentially endogenous 
variables in (10) involving the CIT-rate differential. Following HR and HL, I use the log 
difference in the populations of the affiliates’ and ultimate owner’s host countries as an 
instrument for the potentially endogenous variable. The intuition behind using this instrument is 
that tax haven countries tend to be sparsely populated island countries, often located in the 
Caribbean. In contrast, high CIT-rate countries tend to be more populous OECD countries. I 
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conduct Hausman-Wu specification tests for each model. These tests reject the null hypothesis 
that the variables involving the CIT-rate differential are exogeneous. I also conduct a Wright-
Yogo test which rejects the null hypothesis that the log difference in populations is a weak 
instrument. In short, I believe that the log difference in populations is a valid instrument. It is 
sufficiently correlated with the potentially endogenous variables. Furthermore, there is no reason 
to believe that it belongs in the model of reported profits; so the exclusion restriction is valid, as 
well. 
3.4. Construction of the variables 
The dependent variable is measured by the natural logarithm of reported earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT). Firm-level information on reported EBIT, the value of fixed assets, 
and labor costs by year are from the Orbis database. The CIT-rate differential is constructed 
using the maximum statutory CIT rates of an affiliate’s and ultimate owner’s host countries. 
These data come from Bloomberg and various issues of Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Corporate 
Tax Guides, KPMG’s Global Corporate Tax Summaries, and Price-Waterhouse-Cooper’s Global 
Corporate Tax Summaries.  
The stringency with which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules is a dummy 
variable which is built by the product of two constructed variables. One of the constructed 
variables is a trichotomous variable reflecting the level of documentation that a country requires 
a domestic affiliate of MNE to submit with its CIT return. The second constructed variable is 
also a trichotomous variable reflecting the frequency with which a country applies penalties for 
violating its transfer-pricing documentation requirements. Information used to construct these 
variables comes from Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Transfer Pricing Reference Guide and 
KPMG’s Transfer Pricing Review by country and by year. Table 3 summarizes the criteria used 
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to construct the categorical variables measuring the level of a country’s documentation 
requirements and the frequency with which a country applies penalties for failing to comply with 
its transfer-pricing documentation requirements. 
 
Table 3: Coding of the categorical variables according to a country’s transfer-pricing 
documentation requirements and application penalties for violations 
 
Documentation requirements Penalties applied for violations 
Report KPMG’s 
Transfer Pricing 
Review  
EY’s Worldwide 
Transfer Pricing 
Reference Guide 
KPMG’s 
Transfer Pricing 
Review 
EY’s Worldwide 
Transfer Pricing 
Reference Guide  
Information 
provided in the 
report 
Are transfer- 
pricing required 
to be submitted 
on an annual 
basis? 
Documentation 
requirements and 
return disclosures 
and related-party 
disclosures 
To what extent 
are transfer 
pricing penalties 
enforced? 
Audit 
risk/transfer 
pricing scrutiny 
Coding Answers to the questions stated above 
0 No No documentation 
required. Never None  
1 
No, but 
documents need 
to be prepared 
when requested 
Documents are 
required when a 
firm is audited and 
a firm has some 
time to prepare 
them. 
Not often  Low risk  
2 
No, but 
documents need 
to prepared 
along with the 
tax return 
Documents need to 
be ready when 
requested. 
Increasing   Medium risk  
3 Yes 
Documents need to 
be summited with 
the annual CIT 
return  
Often or always High risk  
 
 
The product of these two constructed categorical variables results in a variable with the 
following six values: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9. For ease of reference, let’s refer to this variable as the 
stringency measure. The enforcement dummy variable in (10) is constructed by setting it equal to 
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one when the stringency measure is greater than or equal to four, and zero otherwise. To test the 
robustness of the model, as discussed in greater detail below, I also estimate a specification in 
which the enforcement variable is set equal to one when the stringency measure is greater than or 
equal to five. This change in the definition of the enforcement dummy variable has no 
appreciable effect on the estimated coefficients. 
Data on GDP per capita and the index of trade freedom by country and year come from 
the World Bank’s Development Indicators (World Bank Group) and the Heritage Foundation’s 
Index of Economic Freedom, respectively. Table 4 reports sample summary statistics. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the full sample  
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Source 
CIT-rate differential (tG – tH) -0.022 0.090 -0.425 0.407 Author 
Average CIT-rate differential 0.009 0.041 -0.167 0.190 Author 
Enforcement regime by the 
subsidiary’s host country 0.259 0.438 0.000 1.000 Author 
Enforcement by the ultimate 
owner’s host country 0.656 0.475 0.000 1.000 Author 
Transfer-pricing rules in the 
subsidiary’s host country 0.991 0.091 0.000 1.000 Author 
Transfer-pricing rules in the 
ultimate owner’s host country 0.909 0.288 0.000 1.000 EY, KPMG 
Transfer-pricing documentation 
required by the subsidiary’s host 
country 
0.149 0.357 0.000 1.000 EY, KPMG 
Transfer-pricing documentation 
required by the ultimate owner’s 
host country 
0.086 0.280 0.000 1.000 EY, KPMG 
Log(subsidiary’s reported profits) 6.426 1.836 -11.236 15.614 ORBIS 
Log(value of fixed assets) 6.559 2.626 -6.001 17.635 Author 
Log(labor costs) 7.610 1.554 -4.977 16.486 Author 
Log(GDP per capita) 10.521 0.386 9.592 11.667 ORBIS 
Index of trade freedomc 68.442 15.544 38.500 96.000 ORBIS 
Index of political stability  0.698 0.392 -0.466 1.514 World Bank 
Note: the number of observations is 190,862.  
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4. The empirical results 
Now, we turn to the discussion of the empirical results. Since the focus of this research is 
obtaining consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits, I report estimates of this 
parameter for a variety of specifications in Table 5. All specifications include a full set of firm 
and industry-year fixed effects, and I report robust standard errors clustered at the MNE level.  
 
Table 5: Instrumental variable estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits 
Empirical specification 
Semi-elasticity of reported profits 
ȕ1 
(without transfer-
pricing rules) 
ȕ1 + ȕ2 
(country H has no 
incentive to enforce 
its transfer-pricing 
rules)  
ȕ1 + ȕ3 
(country G has no 
incentive to enforce 
its transfer-pricing 
rules) 
 Models are estimated on the full sample 
First-generation model 
-1.789*** - - 
Second-generation model A 
-1.589*** -1.039 - 
Second-generation model B 
-9.435* -1.811*** - 
Enforcement model 1 
-3.54*** -3.063* -1.286** 
 Model is estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH > 0 
Enforcement model 2 
-4.741* -3.225* -1.648 
 Models are estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH < 0 
Enforcement model 3 
-4.438* -4.040 -1.041* 
Note: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT). The second-generation model A includes a dummy variable = 1 if the subsidiary’s host country 
requires transfer-pricing documentation to be submitted with the affiliate’s annual CIT return and zero 
otherwise. The second-generation model B includes a dummy variable = 1 if the for the subsidiary’s host 
country has adopted transfer-pricing rules and zero otherwise. The enforcement model includes a dummy 
variable = 1 if the host country of the subsidiary enforces transfer-pricing rules. The instrument for the 
potentially endogenous variable (CIT-rate differential) is the log of the difference in populations of the two 
countries.  
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For the sake of comparison, I estimate a “first-generation model of reported profits,” 
using my sample. This specification does not include a control variable for countries with 
transfer pricing rules. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is reported in the 
row labelled First-generation model and the second column of Table 5. The estimate is equal to -
1.789 and it is distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. This 
estimate has the expected sign. The full set of estimated coefficients for this specification are 
reported in the second column of Table 6. For reasons previously discussed, I believe this model 
is misspecificied and the estimate of the semi-elasticity is inconsistent. 
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Table 6: Instrumental variable estimates of alternative models of reported profits 
Variable 
Empirical specification 
First 
generation 
Second 
generation A 
Second 
generation B 
Enforcement 
model 
IT-rate differential 
(tG – tH ) 
-1.798*** 
(0.633) 
-1.589*** 
(0.512) 
-9.435* 
(5.002) 
-3.540*** 
(1.244) 
Transfer-pricing 
documentation required by 
subsidiary’s host country 
(TPD-SHC) 
- 
0.050** 
(0.023) - - 
TPD-SHC×(tG – tH ) - 0.550 (0.352) - - 
Existence of transfer-
pricing rules in the 
subsidiary’s country 
(ETPR-SHC) 
- - 
1.441* 
(0.810) - 
ETPR-SHC ×(tG – tH ) - - 7.624* (4.379) - 
Enforcement by 
subsidiary’s host country 
(E-SHC) 
- - - 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
E-SHC ×(tG – tH ) - - - 0.477** (0.189) 
Enforcement by ultimate 
owner’s host country (E-
UHC) 
- - - 
-0.081*** 
(0.019) 
E-OHC ×(tG – tH ) - - - 2.254** (0.928) 
Log(value of fixed assets) 0.045*** (0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.003) 
Log(labor costs) 0.447*** (0.006) 
0.447*** 
(0.006) 
0.447*** 
(0.006) 
0.448*** 
(0.006) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.788*** (0.037) 
0.795*** 
(0.037) 
0.776*** 
(0.034) 
0.804*** 
(0.034) 
Index of trade freedom 0.012*** (0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Number of observations 190,862 190,862 190,862 190,862 
R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.045 0.048 
Number of subsidiaries 38,314 38,314 38,314 38,314 
Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in 
parentheses. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ ∗  indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent 
levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-
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level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-
digit level). 
 
Second-generation models include a variety of ways to control for whether a country has 
transfer-pricing rules. Accordingly, I estimate two versions of the second-generation model, 
using my sample. In version of the model that I refer to as the second-generation model A, I 
follow the practice in the literature of controlling for whether a country has adopted transfer-
pricing rules by including a dummy variable equal to one when the subsidiary’s host country 
requires that the affiliates of MNEs submit documentation of their transfer-pricing practices. 
This generation of models includes an interaction term between the CIT-rate differential and the 
dummy variable controlling for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules. As a result, there are two 
distinct estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. There is an estimate for the case in 
which the host country does not have transfer pricing rules, and there is an estimate for the case 
in which the host country of the subsidiary requires submission of documentation of the 
affiliates’ transfer pricing practices. The former estimate is reported in the row labelled Second-
generation model A and the second column of Table 5. This estimate is equal to -1.589. 
Consistent with the theory, the estimate is negative and statistically different from zero at 
conventional levels of significance. The latter estimate is equal to -1.039; however, it is not 
distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. The estimated 
coefficients for this specification are reported in the third column of Table 6.  
In the specification that I refer to as the second-generation model B, I follow the practice 
in the literature of controlling for a country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules, which may or 
may not include documentation of the affiliates’ transfer-pricing practices, by including a 
dummy variable set equal to one when the host country of the subsidiary has adopted transfer-
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pricing rules of some type and zero otherwise. I also include an interaction term between the 
CIT-rate differential and the dummy variable controlling for foreign subsidiary’s adoption of 
transfer-pricing rules. The estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits are reported in the 
row labelled second-generation model B of Table 5 and are equal to -9.435 and -1.811, 
respectively. Consistent with the theory, the estimates are negative and statistically different 
from zero at conventional levels of significance.  
Second-generation models are an improvement over first-generation model because they 
control for whether countries have adopted transfer-pricing rules. However, for these reasons 
previously discussed, these models are misspecified and the estimated semi-elasticities are 
inconsistent. These models do not account for which country – the host country of the subsidiary 
or of the ultimate owner – has adopted transfer-pricing rules, enforces these rules, and has the 
incentive to do so. 
Now, I estimate (10) in which I include a dummy variable to control for whether a 
country enforces its transfer-pricing rules and which country – the host of the affiliate or the 
ultimate owner -- has an incentive to do so. In this specification of the model, there are two 
interaction terms with the CIT-rate differential. There is an interaction term for the case in which 
the host country of the affiliate (ultimate owner) has adopted transfer-pricing rules and has the 
incentive to enforce them. Therefore, this specification results in three potentially distinct values 
of the semi-elasticity of reported profits.7 The estimated coefficients of this specification are 
reported in the fourth column of Table 6. 
                                                          
7
 These three semi-elasticities are defined in terms of (10) by the following expressions: 𝑑ா[୪୬(𝜋𝑔𝑅)|௧ಸ−௧ಹ≥଴,ఊಸ=଴ఊಹ,=଴]𝑑ሺ௧ಸ−௧ಹሻ = ߚଵ; 𝑑ா[୪୬(𝜋𝑔𝑅)|௧ಸ−௧ಹ≥଴,ఊಸ=ଵ,ఊಹ=଴]𝑑ሺ௧ಸ−௧ಹሻ = ߚଵ + ߚଶ; and 𝑑ா[୪୬(𝜋𝑔𝑅)|௧ಸ−௧ಹ<଴,ఊಸ=଴,ఊಹ,=ଵ]𝑑ሺ௧ಸ−௧ಹሻ = ߚଵ + ߚଷ, 
where the subscripts G and H are for the host country of the affiliate and ultimate owner, resespectively. 
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The estimated semi-elasticity for the case in which neither country enforces its transfer-
pricing rules is reported in the row labeled Enforcement model 1 and the second column of Table 
5. The estimated semi-elasticity is equal to -3.540 and is distinguishable from zero at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. This estimate implies a ten-percent increase in the 
CIT-rate differential results in a 35 percent decrease in reported profits, which is substantial. The 
estimate reported in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5 is for the case in which 
the foreign affiliate’s host country has adopted, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so 
because tG – tH > 0. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is equal to -3.063, 
meaning that a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in an approximately 30 
percent decrease in reported profits. Consistent with the theory, this estimate is negative and 
statistically distinguishable from zero at the ten-percent level. Furthermore, it is somewhat 
greater (in absolute value) than the previous estimate when countries do not enforce transfer-
pricing rules. As reported in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5, the semi-
elasticity of reported profits is equal to -1.286 and is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 
5-percent level. This semi-elasticity corresponds to the case in which the ultimate owner’s host 
country has adopted transfer-pricing rules, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so 
because tG – tH < 0. This estimate implies a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential 
results in an approximately 13 percent decrease in reported profits. As predicted by the theory, 
this estimate is smaller (in absolute value) than the estimate when neither country enforces its 
rules. It is also interesting to note that the estimates for the cases when the subsidiary’s and 
ultimate owner’s host countries have the incentive to enforce their rules differ, as well. 
Now, I estimate (10) on two subsamples to test the key assumption that accounting for 
the incentive of a country to enforces its transfer-pricing rules is important for correctly 
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specifying a model of reported profits. In the row labeled Enforcement 2, I report the estimates 
of the semi-elasticities of reported profits on the subsample in which the CIT-rate differential is 
positive or (tG – tH) > 0. In this case, the affiliate’s host country G has an incentive to enforce its 
transfer-pricing rules to mitigate BEPS, but the ultimate owner’s host country does not. 
Consistent with the theory, the semi-elasticity for the case in which the host country of the 
affiliate has the incentive to enforce its rules is negative and statistically distinguishable from 
zero at the ten-percent level, but, as predicted by theory, the estimate when the ultimate owner’s 
host country enforces its rules but has no incentive to do so is indistinguishable from zero at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. I repeat the same exercise on the subsample in 
which the CIT-rate differential is negative or (tG – tH) < 0. In this case, the ultimate owner’s host 
country has an incentive to enforce its rules but the foreign affiliate’s host country does not. The 
estimated semi-elasticities for this subsample are reported in the row labelled Enforcement 
model 2. Consistent with the theory, the semi-elasticity for the case in which the ultimate 
owner’s host country has the incentive to enforce its rules, which is reported in column 3 of 
Table 5, is negative and statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance. 
And, as predicted by the theory, the estimate for the case in which the foreign affiliate’s host 
country enforces its rules but has no incentive to do so because (tG – tH) < 0 is indistinguishable 
from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. These placebo estimates provide 
important evidence that is consistent with the theory. In specifying a model of reported profits, 
the functional form should be sufficiently flexible to permit the estimation of three semi-
elasticities of reported profits. Furthermore, the construction of the enforcement dummy variable 
should account for not only whether the country has adopted rules and enforces them but should 
also account for whether the country has the incentive to enforce its rules given the tax incentives 
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facing domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany transactions with foreign affiliates. 
The estimated coefficients obtained from these two subsamples are reported in columns 2 and 3, 
respectively, of Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Instrumental variable estimates of the enforcement model of reported profits  
Variable 
Sample 
Full 
CIT-rate 
differential 
is positive 
(tG – tH) > 0 
CIT-rate 
differential 
is negative 
(tG – tH) < 0 
CIT-rate differential (tG – tH) 
 
-3.540*** 
(1.244) 
-4.741* 
(1.172) 
-4.438* 
(1.809) 
Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the 
subsidiary’s host country (ETPR-SHC) -0.001 (0.020) 
-0.081*** 
(0.031) 
0.008 
(0.036) 
ETPR-SHC×(tG – tH) 0.477** (0.189) 
1.516* 
(0.900) 
0.392 
(0.336) 
Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the ultimate 
owner’s host country (ETPR-UHC) -0.026 (0.019) 
-0.161 
(0.214) 
0.092 
(0.078) 
ETPR-UHC×(tG – tH) 2.254** (0.928) 
3.093 
(4.311) 
3.397** 
(1.600) 
Log(value of fixed assets) 0.045*** (0.003) 
0.042*** 
(0.005) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
Log(labor costs) 0.448*** (0.006) 
0.433*** 
(0.010) 
0.462*** 
(0.008) 
Log(GDP per capita) 0.804*** (0.034) 
0.733*** 
(0.065) 
0.857*** 
(0.043) 
Index of trade freedom 0.0138*** (0.002) 
0.0171*** 
(0.003) 
0.0120*** 
(0.003) 
Number of observations 190,862 80,702 107,730 
R-squared 0.048 0.041 0.053 
Number of affiliates 38,314 17,137 22,475 
Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in 
parentheses. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ ∗  indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent 
levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-
level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-
digit level.  
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To gauge the robustness of the main results to alternative specifications, estimate a 
specification of the model in which I add a control variable for political stability. The estimated 
coefficients of this specification are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 8. This model is estimated 
on the full sample and the two subsamples previously described. The estimated coefficients have 
the expected signs and statistical significance. Next, I examine the robustness of my main 
findings to an alternative definition of the stringency with which a country enforces its rules. 
More specifically, I redefine ȖGt and ȖHt to be equal to one when the constructed categorical 
variable for the frequency of applying penalties is equal to or greater than six rather than four as 
in the case of the previous specifications. The estimated coefficients of this specification are 
reported in columns 4-6 of Table 8. Again, I estimate this specification on the full sample and the 
two subsamples previously described. The estimated coefficients of this specification have the 
expected signs and statistical significance. 
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Table 8: Robustness of the main results to the inclusion of a political stability index and to an 
alternative definition of enforcement 
Variable 
Includes an index of political stability Alternative definition of 
enforcement 
Sample Sample 
Full (tG – tH) > 0 (tG – tH) < 0 Full (tG – tH) > 0 (tG – tH) < 0 
CIT-rate 
differential 
(tG – tH) 
-3.518*** 
(1.245) 
-6.217* 
(4.920) 
-4.049** 
(1.806) 
-2.977*** 
(1.006) 
-2.709 
(5.297) 
-2.980** 
(1.260) 
Enforcement by 
subsidiary’s 
host county (E-
SHC) 
-0.0111 
(0.0209) 
-0.0921*** 
(0.0303) 
-0.00869 
(0.0363) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
-0.043 
(0.052) 
0.007 
(0.035)  
E-SHC×(tG – 
tH) 
0.393** 
(0.192) 
1.637* 
(0.881) 
0.266 
(0.337) 
0.661*** 
(0.233) 
0.682* 
(0.253) 
0.464 
(0.338) 
Enforcement by 
ultimate 
owner’s host 
county (E-
UHC) 
-0.0236 
(0.0188) 
-0.219 
(0.205) 
0.0818 
(0.0782) 
0.044** 
(0.018) 
0.113 
(0.168) 
0.024 
(0.064) 
E-UHC×(tG – 
tH) 
2.237** 
(0.929) 
 
4.290 
(4.107) 
 
3.087* 
(1.596) 
 
1.715** 
(0.679) 
1.853 
(2.841) 
2.272* 
(1.214) 
Log(value of 
fixed assets) 
0.045*** 
(0.00301) 
0.042*** 
(0.00499) 0.044*** (0.004) 
0.045*** 
(0.003) 
0.044*** 
(0.005) 
0.044**
* 
(0.004) 
Log(labor costs) 
0.450*** 
(0.006) 
0.433*** 
(0.010) 0.462*** (0.009) 
0.448*** 
(0.006) 
0.428*** 
(0.011) 
0.463**
* 
(0.008) 
Log(GDP per 
capita) 
0.447*** 
(0.00613) 
0.433*** 
(0.00959) 0.844*** (0.0436) 
0.794*** 
(0.035) 
0.770*** 
(0.068) 
0.849**
* 
(0.044) 
Index of trade 
freedom 
0.013*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 0.0109*** (0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.01 
(0.003) 
0.012**
* 
(0.003) 
Political 
stability index  
0.0719*** 
(0.0195) 
0.0779** 
(0.0308) 
0.0827*** 
(0.0263) - - - 
 
      Number of 
observations 190,862 80,702 107,730 190,862 80,702 107,730 
R-squared 0.048 0.041 0.053 0.048 0.041 0.053 
Number of 
affiliates 38,314 17,137 22,475 38,314 17,137 22,475 
Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT). The estimates of reported in right-hand-side panel of the table uses an alternative definition the 
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dummy variable for a country’s enforcement of transfer-pricing rules. The dummy variable = 1.0 when the 
constructed categorical variable is greater than or equal to 5 (rather than 4) and zero otherwise. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗∗  
indicates statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is 
active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each 
specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level). 
 
5. Policy simulation  
To illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly specifying the 
empirical model of reported profits, I report describe the results of a policy simulation in this 
section. For purposes of the simulation, I assume the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 
percent. A 20 percent cut in the top statutory CIT rate of the U.S. would be equivalent to a tax 
rate of 15 percent, instead of the current-law rate of 35 percent. This proposal is particularly 
relevant because the United States has one of the highest top statutory CIT rates in the world, and 
there is an ongoing policy debate about the merits of the United States reducing its top statutory 
CIT rate to make it more competitive with that of other countries.  
For the sake of comparison, I use the estimated semi-elasticities for reported profits 
obtained from the First–generation model reported and Enforcement model 1, which are reported 
in the corresponding rows of Table 5, to provide two estimates of the policy simulation. The 
estimates for the policy simulation based on the First-generation model of the effect of the 
proposal on the percent change in reported CIT revenue by country and on the percent change in 
aggregate reported firm EBIT by country are reported in columns two and three, respectively, of 
Table 9, Similarly, the estimates for the policy simulation based on the Enforcement 1 model are 
reported in columns four and five, of Table 9.8  
 
                                                          
8
 The simulation for the first generation model I used column 1 if Table 6. 8 To run the simulation for the 
enforcement model I used column 4 if Table 6 
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Table 9: Policy simulation of the effect of the United States decreasing its CIT rate to 15 percent 
 
Country 
Based on the first-generation model Based on the enforcement model  
Percent change 
in tax revenue by 
country 
Percent change  
in the sum of 
affiliate’s  
reported profits 
by country 
Percent change 
in tax revenue by 
country 
Percent change  
in the sum of 
affiliate’s  
reported profits 
by country 
Austria -4.48 -4.48 -2.53 -2.53 
Belgium -5.79 -5.79 -4.34 -4.34 
Britain -8.33 -8.33 -6.25 -6.25 
Czech -3.22 -3.22 -2.41 -2.41 
Denmark -5.40 -5.40 -2.67 -2.67 
Estonia -1.76 -1.76 -1.32 -1.32 
Finland -5.13 -5.13 -3.85 -3.85 
France -4.88 -4.88 -3.66 -3.66 
Germany -5.29 -5.29 -2.62 -2.62 
Iceland -4.32 -4.32 -3.24 -3.24 
Ireland -9.03 -9.03 -6.78 -6.78 
Italy -5.03 -5.03 -3.77 -3.77 
Japan -6.27 -6.27 -4.71 -4.71 
Netherlands -5.91 -5.91 -4.43 -4.43 
New Zealand -8.91 -8.91 -6.69 -6.69 
Norway -3.22 -3.22 -2.42 -2.42 
Portugal -3.09 -3.09 -1.53 -1.53 
Slovenia -2.48 -2.48 -1.86 -1.86 
South Korea -5.56 -5.56 -3.93 -3.93 
Spain -4.65 -4.65 -2.47 -2.47 
Sweden -4.35 -4.35 -3.27 -3.27 
United States -28.36 43.29 -35.55 28.91 
Note: The percent change in tax revenue is percent difference in proposed-law tax revenue with respect to 
current-law tax revenue by country. The percent change in affiliate’s reported profits is the percent change in the 
difference in the sum of affiliates’ reported profits revenue under proposed law with respect to affiliates’ reported 
profits under current law. 
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There are three noteworthy findings in Table 9. First, every country, except the United 
States, experiences a decrease in aggregate reported firm revenue. In contrast, the U.S. 
experiences an increase in aggregate reported firm revenue as a result. Second, every country, 
including the U.S., experiences a decrease in CIT revenue. In the case of the U.S., this finding 
shows that the increase in the CIT tax base or aggregate reported firm revenue is not large 
enough to offset the effect of the 20 percent reduction in the U.S. CIT rate. For the other 
countries, the decrease in CIT revenues is proportional to the decrease in the country’s CIT tax 
base as a result of the proposal because they do not change their current-law CIT rate. Third, and 
most importantly for the purposes at hand, the estimated effect of the proposed reform on the 
percent decrease in CIT revenues for the U.S. is 15 percentages points smaller using estimates 
obtained from the Enforcement 1 model relative to that based on the First-generation model. In 
sum, this exercise illustrates the practical importance of using a correctly specified model to 
estimate the effect on reported profits of CIT-rate differentials for tax policy analysis. 
6. Conclusions 
As globalization increases so has international tax competition among countries to attract 
foreign direct investment. The resulting CIT-rate differentials among countries is leading to 
BEPS as MNEs shift profits from affiliates located in high CIT-rate countries to affiliates located 
in low CIT rate countries to minimize their aggregate tax liabilities thus increasing their 
worldwide after-tax profits.  
This paper seeks to gauge the effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries on BEPS. I 
improve upon the existing literature by accounting for whether countries actually enforce their 
transfer-pricing rules and when they have the incentive to do so because of the tax incentive 
facing domestic affiliates of MNEs. I report strong evidence that correctly specifying the model 
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of reported profits in the manner prescribed in this paper has important implications for the 
correct choice of function form and a substantial effect on the estimated semi-elasticities of 
reported profits. The main results are the following: the estimated semi-elasticity of BEPS is 
equal to -3.5, meaning that a 10% increase in the tax rate differential between countries results in 
a 35% decrease in reported earnings in the high tax country; when there is an increase in the 
incentive for outbound profit shifting, firms that are located in countries with strict anti-
avoidance rules report 32% more profits than otherwise; when there is an increase in the 
incentive for inbound profit shifting, firms with ultimate owners located in countries with strict 
anti-avoidance rules report 10% less profits than otherwise.  
I also conduct a policy simulation to illustrate the practical importance to tax policy 
analysis. I use my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as an 
estimate of this semi-elasticity using a state-of-the-art but misspecified model to conduct the 
policy simulation. This exercise shows that using estimates of the semi-elasticities from a 
correctly specified model (that takes into account enforcement) has a substantial effect on the 
estimated tax revenue effect of the proposed reform. 
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Chapter II: Does Macroeconomic News Affect Monetary Policy Expectations and Asset 
Prices? Evidence from Event Studies 
1. Introduction 
Government authorities and investors were strongly impacted by the market loanable 
funds during the recent financial crisis. Since interest rates are prices of loanable funds, they play 
a crucial rule in moments of economic instability, like the 2008-2010 Great Recession. Interest 
rates are indirectly set by a country’s central bank; they increase (decrease) when a central bank 
conducts contractionary (expansionary) open market operations in periods of economic 
expansion (recession).  
The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. It influences interest rates 
by setting the price that depositary institutions, such as banks, need to pay in order to borrow 
reserves overnight (known as the discount rate) and by determining the level of reserve 
requirements. Usually, depositary institutions prefer to trade excess reserves to met overnight 
reserve requirements among another because it is less expensive and because there is a stigma 
assisted with borrowing from the central bank (lender of last resort). In simpler terms, a 
depository institution with excess cash lends to another depositary institution that needs to 
quickly raise liquidity at a price called the federal fund rate, which is always lower than the 
discount rate.  
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is the branch of the Federal Reserve that 
determines the federal fund rate target9 that can be reached by deciding the level of reserve 
requirements and the discount rate. Indeed, the Federal Reserve indirectly sets the federal fund 
                                                          
9
 This rate influences the effective federal funds rate through open market operations or by buying and selling of 
government bonds (government debt). More specifically, the Federal Reserve decreases liquidity by selling 
government bonds, thereby raising the federal funds rate because banks have less liquidity to trade with other banks. 
Similarly, the Federal Reserve can increase liquidity by buying government bonds, decreasing the federal funds rate 
because banks have excess liquidity for trade.  
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rate. Whether the Federal Reserve wants to conduct expansionary or contractionary open market 
operations depends on the state of the economy. If the FOMC believes the economy is growing 
too fast and inflationary pressures are consistent with the Federal Reserve’s objective, the 
Committee may set a higher federal funds rate target to control economic activity. In the 
opposing scenario, the FOMC may set a lower federal funds rate target to stimulate the economy. 
Therefore, the FOMC must observe the current state of the economy to determine the best course 
of monetary policy that will maximize economic growth and achieve economic stability. The 
federal funds rate influences other interest rates such as the prime rate, which is the rate banks 
charge their customers for credit cards. Additionally, the federal funds rate indirectly influences 
long-term interest rates such as mortgages, loans, and savings, in order to promote consumer 
wealth and financial markets confidence.   
As a consequence, a lot of research has been done in trying to understand the dynamics 
behind monetary policy expectations and investments decision-making is essential for a central 
bank and financial investors. By correctly predicting monetary policies, investors can build 
accurate asset pricing models and potentially increase their return on investments. From the 
perspective of the Federal Reserve, assessing the linkages between monetary policy expectations 
and investors’ behavior is important in order to promote economic stability and reaffirm 
confidence in financial markets when needed. Given that the Federal Reserve adjusts its open 
market operation depending on the state of the economy, so should investors.  
In this paper, I investigate the effect of macroeconomic news announcements on 
monetary policies expectations and ultimately on financial markets in the United States. I 
contribute to the existing literature by estimating the following: the effect of macroeconomic 
news surprises on short and long-term monetary policy expectations calculated using federal 
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funds rates and LIBOR rates;10 the effect of positive and negative macroeconomic news 
announcements on monetary policy expectations; the effect of changes in short and long-term 
monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of macroeconomic news 
announcements compared to days of FOMC announcements. Differently from Gurkaynak, Sack, 
and Swanson (2004); Doh and Connelly (2013) and Berge and Cao (2014), I compute a factor 
analysis using federal funds futures and Eurodollar futures11 collected not only on days of FOMC 
announcements, but also on days when other macroeconomic indicators are publically 
announcement. To be more specific, I extended the event study to days of non-farm payroll, 
initial job claims, gross domestic product (GDP), Institute for Supply Management (ISM) 
survey, Consumer Price Index (CPI),12 consumer confidence index, University of Michigan 
consumer sentiment index, retail sales13 and new home sales announcements. To simplify the 
terminology used in this paper, I refer to the above indicators as “macroeconomic 
indicators/news” announcements (to distinguish them from FOMC announcements). FOMC 
announcement days are considered any day when there is an FOMC meeting followed by a 
public testimony or a statement and days when the “minutes” comes out. These macroeconomic 
indicators are selected based on their Bloomberg relevance index, which identify financial 
markets most followed economic releases. The methodology used is a Newy-West event study 
on 2,387 announcement days from 1998 to 2016.  
I conclude that short and long-term monetary policy expectations are affected by 
                                                          
10
 LIBOR or ICE LIBOR (previously BBA LIBOR) is a benchmark rate that some of the world's leading banks 
charge each other for short-term loans. The market expectations of the LIBOR rate are inbounded in the Eurodollar 
futures.  
11
 Eurodollar futures are time deposits denominated in U.S. dollars at banks outside the United States, and thus are 
not under the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve. Eurodollar futures are based on the LIBOR rate that is a 
benchmark rate that some of the world's leading banks charge each other for short-term loans. This is also used as an 
estimate of bank lending costs.  
12
 Month to month percentage change.  
13
 Month to month percentage change. 
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unexpected changes in non-farm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer 
confidence index, University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home 
sales. Furthermore, I report evidence that financial investors expect interest rates to rise (fall) 
when there are positive14 (negative) macroeconomic indicator announcements. Finally, the 
reaction of financial markets on changes in both short and long-term monetary policy 
expectations is larger in absolute value on days of macroeconomic indicator announcements 
compared to days of FOMC announcement. However, it is important to note that asset prices and 
volatility respond differently to news announcements (see results for details). Finally, I check for 
robustness by subsampling my event study to announcements made exclusively during the latest 
global financial crisis (December 2007-June 2010). In this latter case I observe that differently 
from long-term monetary policy expectations, short-term monetary policy expectations are not 
effected by macroeconomic news surprises, which occurs when the market over/under estimate 
the true value of a macroeconomic indicator.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview 
of the literature on the effect of FOMC announcements and macroeconomic indicator surprises 
on asset prices and volatility. Section 3 provides an outline on the variable construction, data and 
methodology. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis including the model, results and 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.  
                                                          
14
 News is considered to be positive (negative) when the realized value is higher (lower) than the market forecast, 
except for change in initial job claims when news is considered to be positive (negative) when the realized value is 
lower (higher) than the market forecast.  
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2. Literature review 
This section begins with an overview of the literature on the effect of monetary policy 
expectations on financial markets followed by an overview of the literature on the effect of 
macroeconomic news surprises on financial markets.  
The original literature suggests that changes in monetary policies are transferred to the 
stock market via changes in the cost of capital and private wealth (Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005). 
Indeed, it is not surprising that US stocks and bonds do react to changes in monetary policy 
expectations (Gurkaynak, Sack, & Swanson, 2004; Wongswan, 2009). For example, rising short-
term interest rates in the U.S. result in a decline in stock market prices and in an upward shift of 
the yield curve (Rigobon & Sack, 2004). The impact that changes in monetary policies have on 
financial market mainly depends on financial market’s current expectation of these policies, 
which are deducted by following FOMC announcements and looking at the state of the economy. 
Federal funds futures can be used to approximate investors’ monetary policy expectation (Berge, 
2012; Berge & Cao, 2014; Bernanke & Kuttner, 2005; Doh & Connolly, 2013; Gospodinov & 
Jamali, 2012, 2014; Gurkaynak et al., 2004; Hamilton, 1996; Robertson & Thornton, 1997). 
Hamilton (1996) is the first research to use federal funds rates to calculate short and long-term 
unexpected changes in monetary policy expectations (known as monetary policy surprises). He 
computes them by taking the difference between a federal funds future observed on days of 
FOMC announcements and its value before the announcement. Therefore, the estimated 
difference captures financial markets unexpected changes in monetary policies. When the 
difference is zero, it means that the financial markets have correctly predicted the Federal 
Reserve’s action, so there are no surprises. When the difference is not zero, the financial markets 
were not able to anticipate the monetary policy currently. When the difference is calculated using 
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a federal funds future that matures in the current month, this difference captures short-term 
monetary policy surprises. Differently from the short-run monetary policy expectations, the 
three-month federal fund future is used to capture long-term monetary policy surprises.  
Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004), henceforth GSS, improved upon the existing 
literature by showing that the effects of FOMC announcements on financial markets is not  
driven by a single factor (changes in the federal funds rate target), but two factors. GSS offer an 
alternative way to capture monetary policy expectations surprises by using both federal funds 
futures and LIBOR rates. By computing a factor analysis, GSS summarize changes in short-term 
and long-term monetary policy expectations with two factors: the target factor and path factors. 
These factors have a structural interpretation as a “current federal funds rate target” factor and a 
“future path of policy” factor.  
 The target and path factors estimated by GSS and the short and long term monetary 
policy surprises introduced by Hamilton (1996) are intermittently used to access the effect of 
monetary policy expectations on assets prices and market volatility. Overall, researchers have 
found that there is a negative relationship between long term unexpected changed changes of 
monetary policy (path factor) and asset prices, while there is a positive relationship between both 
the target and path factor and the yield of corporate/treasury bonds (Berge & Cao, 2014; 
Gospodinov & Jamali, 2014; Gurkaynak et al., 2004). According to GSS, one percentage point 
contraction in the accompanying FOMC statement leads to a decline of 4.3 percent in the return 
of the S&P500 as well as an increase of 47, 27 and 12 basis points in the yields of the two, five, 
ten-years treasury note, respectively. These results, even if small, match the theory, which 
suggest that there is an inverse relationship between bond prices and interest rates. On the other 
side, although the relationship between interest rates and the stock market is fairly indirect, it is 
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difficult to predict in which direction to the stock market moves when there is a cut or increase in 
interest rates.  
According to Doh & Connolly (2013) the signs and statistical significance of the effect of 
monetary policy expectations on financial markets are consistent before and after the latest 
recession, but not their magnitude. For instance, the elasticity of asset prices and bond yields to 
changes in monetary policy expectations are larger before the 2008-2009 financial crisis than 
during the crisis. This could be explain by the fact that investors anticipated that the recession 
was going to be long one and that the Federal Reserve was going to keep interest rates low for a 
very long time.  
A great deal of work has also been done on the effect of macroeconomic news 
announcements on asset prices (Brenner, Pasquariello, & Subrahmanyam, 2009; Flannery & 
Protopapadakis, 2002; Gospodinov & Jamali, 2012; Hardouvelis, 1987; Kim, McKenzie, & Faff, 
2004; Scotti, 2013). Scotti (2013) shows that the surprise indexes are a parsimonious summary 
measure of the state of the economy and its business cycle.15 Gospodinov & Jamali (2012) use 
changes in non-farm employment, consumer confidence and industrial production as a 
robustness check. They conclude that the implied volatility of the S&P500 no longer exhibits a 
larger response to monetary policy surprises relative to its realized volatility when these 
indicators are added into their model. Gilbert, Scotti, Strasser, & Vega (2010) conclude that 
macroeconomic indicators announcements do not have the same effect on all asset prices. 
Flannery at al. (2001) demonstrate that stock market returns are significantly correlated with 
inflation and money growth.  They estimate a GARCH model of daily equity returns, where 
                                                          
15
 For example, if the unemployment rate is low it shows that the economy is performing well. When the 
unemployment becomes suddenly high it is considered a negative surprise. If this indicator keeps staying negative it 
might suggest that an anticipated recession is coming. Eventually market predictions of unemployment rate will 
adjust to he “new low values”.  
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realized returns and their conditional volatility depend on 17 macro series announcements.  
While a lot of research has been done on the effect of monetary policy expectations and 
macroeconomic news surprises on financial markets, very little has been done on the effect of 
macroeconomic news surprises on monetary policy expectations. Someone might argue that 
there is a simultaneous causality between macroeconomic news surprises and monetary policy 
expectations: monetary policies influence the state of the economy and investors expectations of 
macroeconomic news, but at the same time macroeconomic news influence the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy decision making (as argued in the introduction of this paper). In 
reality, the chances that investors forecast short- and long-term macroeconomic indicators based 
on the current monetary policy decision are very low since no one can correctly predict how long 
it takes for a monetary stimulus to affect the real economy. This paper aims to fill the gaps 
between the literatures described above by first estimating the effect of macroeconomic news 
surprises on monetary policy expectation, and secondly by testing whether or not financial 
markets react strongly to changes in monetary policy expectations on days of macroeconomic 
news announcements compared to days of FOMC announcements. 
3. Variable construction, data and methodology 
   This section describes in details the methodology used to calculate the target and path 
factors as well as macroeconomic indicator surprises.  Here, I also summarized the data used in 
the empirical portion of the paper and their origin. 
 3.1. Target and path factors 
As previously discussed, monetary policy expectations can be measured using federal 
funds futures since they are excellent predictors of the federal funds rates (Hamilton, 2001). A 
federal funds future can be viewed as the expected average price for federal funds in a particular 
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contract month (Robertson & Thornton, 1997).16 Following Hamilton (1996), in this paper short-
term monetary policy surprises are calculated by subtracting the value of the current month 
federal funds future before the release of a macroeconomic indictor or FOMC announcement to 
its values on the announcement day, scaled by the remaining days to maturity, as the following:17  
                                                     ∆𝑖௨,଴ = ஽஽−𝑑  ( ௠݂,𝑑଴ − ௠݂,𝑑−ଵ଴ )                                                    (1) ∆𝑖௨,଴ is the monetary policy unexpected surprise of a federal funds future that expires in the 
current month (zero means zero months ahead, so the current month); ௠݂,𝑑଴  is the federal funds future 
observed on day, d, of month, m, that expires in the current month; ௠݂,𝑑−ଵ଴  is the federal funds future 
observed on day, d, of month, m, that expires in the current month; d is the day of a month when a 
monetary policy announcement is made, D is the total number of days in a month, m. Similarly, to (1), 
equation (2) denotes long-term monetary policy surprises. These are calculated by taking the difference 
between the expected federal funds future on the day when a macroeconomic news or FOMC meeting is 
observed and its value the day before the announcement, scaled by the remaining days to the next 
announcement, and by subtracting the short-term surprise calculated in equation (1), as the following:  
                                  ∆𝑖௨,௡ = ஽𝑛஽𝑛−𝑑𝑛 [( ௠݂𝑑௡ − ௠݂,𝑑−ଵ௡ ) − 𝑑𝑛஽𝑛  ∆𝑖௨,଴]  for n=1,..10                           (2) ∆𝑖௨,௡ is the monetary policy surprise of a federal fund future that expires on month, n; ݀௡ 
and ܦ௡ are the day of the next news announcement (both FOMC and macroeconomic news) and 
the number of days in the month containing the next announcement, respectively.  
In order to capture the monetary policy expectation embodied in the Eurodollar futures I 
first need to subtract the value of the Eurodollar from 100 to isolate the LIBOR rate (L). Second, 
I compute the following equation: 
                                                          
16
 The future value of the federal fund rate is calculated by subtracting the contract price of the future from one 
hundred. 
17If the event happened within the last seven days of a month I will use the following month future value to compute 
the shock.  
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                                             ∆ܮ∝ = ܮ௠𝑑∝ −ܮ௠,𝑑−ଵ∝                    for α=1, .., 10                    (3) 
Here ܮ௠𝑑∝  is the value of the 3-month LIBOR rate at day, d, and month, m; ܮ௠,𝑑−ଵ∝  is the 
value of the LIBOR rate before the macroeconomic announcement or FOMC meeting/minute 
realized; ∝ is the quarter when the Eurodollar future matures.  
In this paper, I use federal funds futures that expire at different maturities starting from 
the current month to ten months ahead and Eurodollar futures that expire at different maturities 
starting from the current quarter to ten quarters ahead. After calculating equations (1), (2) and (3) 
on the eleven federal funds futures and eleven LIBOR rate on 2,310 announcement days, I 
finally compute a factor analysis.18  
As previously anticipated by GSS, I obtain two factors that summarize 88 percent19 of all 
variations in the monetary policy surprises calculated using equations (1), (2) and (3). These 
factors are known as the target factor (short-term monetary policies expectations) and the path 
factor (long-term monetary policies changes expectations). Figure 2 portrays values of path and 
target factors from 1998 to 2016.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 Details on the methodology used to compute the factor analysis are summarized in details by Doh & Connolly 
(2013). 
19
 This number is calculated based on the factor loadings of each variable after the orthogonal rotation. Results are 
available upon request.  
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Figure 2. Target (short-term monetary policy expectations) and path factors (long-term monetary 
policy expectations) from 1998 to 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Author’s calculations. Values are expressed in basis points.  
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 According to Figure 2, since 2009 the target factor has been close to zero, while the path 
factor has been more volatile. This implies that financial markets do not change their short-term 
monetary policy beliefs as often as their long-term beliefs. Table 10 shows the top five largest 
positive and negative changes in the target and path factors and their corresponding 
macroeconomic events.  
 
Table 10: Largest movements of the path and target factors 
Largest movements of the Target Factor 
Date Target Path Macroeconomic release 
22-Jan-08 -79.97 -19.62 FOMC 
18-Sep-01 -41.71 27.22 CPI 
18-Apr-01 -41.11 -16.86 FOMC 
20-Sep-01 37.28 -14.95 Initial Job Claims 
3-Jen-01 -35.00 35.55 FOMC 
Largest movements of the Path Factor 
Date Target Path Macroeconomic release 
5-Jun-09 0.18 86.42 Change in Non-Farm Payroll 
29-Sep-08 16.62 66.02 FOMC 
6-Aug-04 -2.03 -58.92 Change in Non-Farm Payroll 
24-Jan-08 12.44 56.75 Initial Job Claims 
05-Sep-03 5.64 -56.52 Change in Non-Farm Payroll 
Source: Author’s calculations, Bloomberg Calendar.  
According to Table 10, several outliers of both the target and the path factor are observed 
on days when macroeconomic indicators are announced instead of days of FOMC 
announcements. The top ten outliers listed in Table 10, correspond to the following economic 
  
57 
news reported by the New York Times, CNN Money or Federal Reserve Board of Governor:  
 April 18th, 2001: the U.S. stocks rallied after the Federal Reserve rocked Wall Street with 
a surprise interest rate cut, lifting hopes that corporate profits will recover sooner than 
expected.  
 January 22nd, 2008:  Federal Reserve makes the biggest Federal fund rate cut in nearly 24 
years.  
 September 18th, 2001: this day was the first trading day after the September 11 attacks. 
Plus, on September 17th, the Federal Reserve lowered the target rate of 50 basis points on 
September 17th, 2001.  
 September 20th, 2001:  jobless claims tumbled to 387,000 well below Wall Street 
forecasts of 420,000. However, this day is well known as President Bush declaration of 
“War on Terror” after the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2011.  
  January 3rd, 2001: the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan announced a surprise 
interest rate cut. 
 June 5th, 2009: CNN Money reported “annual loss biggest since the end of World War II. 
Unemployment rate rises to 7.2 percent”.  
 September 29th, 2008: The Federal Reserve dropped the target rate to 1 percent as the 
pace of economic activity appears to have slowed remarkably.  
 August 6th, 2004: the job growth was weaker than the market expected.  
 January 24th, 2008: the $150 billion stimulus approved by the Bush administration 
account its first difficulties.  
 September 5th, 2003: CNN money reports that defying private economists' forecasts for 
an increase and highlighting fears that the labor market could be slow to catch up to 
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stronger growth in the rest of the economy.  
 
3.2. Macroeconomic indicators surprises 
 
The macroeconomic indicators used in this paper have been selected based on their 
Bloomberg relevance index.20 The latter identify the major macroeconomic indicators that 
investors rigorously follow on Bloomberg. The Bloomberg relevance index for FOMC meetings 
is currently 97.2, making it the third most relevant news to investors after changes in non-farm 
payroll and job claims. The surprise index for each of the macroeconomic indicators listed in 
Table 1121 is calculated as the following:  
                                                                     ܫ௧௜ = ௬𝑡𝑖−୫[௬𝑡𝑖|ℱ𝑖]𝜎𝑖                                                        (4) 
Here, i represents one of the nine indicators listed in Table 12; t is the day when indicator 
i was publically announced; ܫ௧௜ is the normalized surprise index of indicator i at time t; ݕ௧௜ is the 
actual value of a macroeconomic indicators; m[ݕ௧௜|ℱ௜] is the median Bloomberg forecast of 
indicator i; and𝜎௜ is the standard deviation of the forecasts of indicator i. Each indicator is 
normalized to allow comparison between each other. I also create a dummy variable that is equal 
to one when a macroeconomic surprise is positive and zero otherwise22:   
𝛝𝐢 = {= ૚ 𝐢𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐢 > ૙= ૙ 𝐢𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐢 < ૙ 
 
Where ϑ୧ is a dummy variable for negative (=0) or positive(=1) news.  
                                                          
20
 The Bloomberg relevance is a number between zero to one hundred: zero meaning that investors never look at a 
specific indictor when it comes out, one hundred meaning that investors always look at a specific indicators when it 
comes out. It is based on the number of clicks on Bloomberg at the moment of the news release.  
21 MBA Mortgage Applications is also a highly observed by financial markets but Bloomberg does not keep truck 
of its forecast standard deviation making impossible to normalize the surprise component of this index. Indeed, this 
index is excluded from the empirical analysis 
22
 Expect for changes in initial job claims that are equal to one if less than zero and zero otherwise.  
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Table 11: List of macroeconomic indicators and their Bloomberg relevance index  
Indexes  
Indicators  Relevance Index 
Change In Non-Farm Payroll (NP) 99.2% 
Initial Job Claims (JL) 98.4% 
GDP (GDP) 96.8% 
ISM (IMS) 95.9% 
CPI MoM (CPI) 95.2% 
Consumer Confidence Index (CCI)  94.4% 
U. Michigan Consumer Confidence Index (UM)  93.6% 
Retails Sales MoM (RS) 91.9% 
New Home Sales (NSH) 90.3% 
 
3.3. Data 
Data on federal funds futures, Eurodollar futures, macroeconomic news forecast, S&P500 
closing price and the VIX are collected from Bloomberg. Daily data on the yield curve are 
downloaded from the U.S. Department of Treasury. The lists of days when a macroeconomic 
indictor is released to the public or there is a FOMC announcement are collected from 
Bloomberg and the Board of Governors. The summary statistics of all variables are available in 
Table 12.  
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Table 12:  Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Target factor  0.104 3.910 -46.63 27.62 
Path factor 0.0154 15.70 -54.88 72.32 
Returns of the S&P 500   0.0601 1.260 -9.035 10.79 
Three-months treasury bill 
-0.507 4.823 -52 46.00 
One-year treasury note 
-0.386 4.316 -50 22 
Ten-years treasury note  0.00216 6.351 -28.00 24.00 
VIX 
-9.025 166.6 -1310 1412 
Dummy variable for good news 0.310 0.463 0 1 
Change in Non-Farm Payroll Surprise 
-0.0424 0.727 -8.190 6.350 
GDP surprise 
-0.0115 0.557 -5.670 5.900 
New Home Sales Surprise 
-0.000909 0.925 -8 8.860 
Retail Sales Surprise 
-0.0102 0.536 -5.220 7.070 
Initial Job Claims Surprise 0.00118 1.633 -27.58 12.55 
Consumer Confidence Surprise 
-0.0150 0.908 -9.070 7.980 
University of Michigan Consumers 
Confidence Index Surprise -0.0445 1.009 -9.530 8.660 
ISM Surprise 
-0.00497 0.709 -11.85 6.380 
CPI Surprise 
-0.0117 0.415 -4.130 3.950 
Note: The total number of events is 2,387.  
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4. Empirical estimation 
     4.1. Econometric model  
The methodology used is a Newey-West event study on a predefined window of one day 
between January 1998 and March 2016. The events included in this study are associated with the 
public release of the nine indicators listed in Table 11 and FOMC announcements.  
First, in order to investigate the effect of macroeconomic indicators announcements on 
monetary policies expectations I estimate the following equation:                                   ܯ௠,𝑑 = ߙ + ∑ ߚ௝𝑋௠,𝑑ଽ௝=ଵ + ߳௧                                                             (5) 
 ܯ௠,𝑑  is the target or the path factor calculated on day d and month m as explained in 
section 3.1; ߚ௝ depends on news j (=1, ..,9); 𝑋௠,𝑑 is a vector of macro news surprises calculated 
on day d and month m as explained in section 3.2.    
Second, in order to investigate the effect of positive and negative news announcements 
on monetary policies expectations I estimate the following equation:                                            ܯ௠,𝑑 = ߙ + ߚ௝ߜ௠,𝑑 + ߳௧                                                             (6) 
Where ߜ௠,𝑑 is a dummy variable equal to one if a news is positive and zero otherwise.  
Finally, I look at the effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets when 
macroeconomic news are released compared to days of FOMC announcements using the 
following equation: 
  ݕ௠,𝑑 = ߙ + ߙଵܲܽݐℎ + ߙଶܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ + ∑ ߚ௡௜ ߟ௜ଽ௡=ଵ + ∑ ߚ௞௜ ܲܽݐℎ ∗ ߟ௜ଵ଼௞=ଵ଴ + ∑ ߚ௤௜ ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ ∗ ߟ௜ଶ଻௤=ଵ଼ + ߳௧  (7) 
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Here, ߟ௜ is a dummy variable equal to one on the day when a macroeconomic indicator i 
is observed and 0 otherwise; i corresponds to following indicators: non-farm payroll, initial job 
claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence index, University of Michigan consumer 
sentiment index, retails sales and new home sales; ߚ௞௝ሺߚ௤௝ሻ identifies whether or not long-term 
(short-term) monetary policy expectations have a larger or smaller effect on financial markets on 
days of a macroeconomic news announcement compared to days of FOMC announcements. In 
equation (7), the base group corresponds to days of FOMC announcements and their interaction 
terms with target and path factors.  
4.2. Results 
Table 13 reports the estimates of equations (5) and (6). Table 14 shows the results 
obtained after estimating equation (7). According to Table 13, macroeconomic news surprises do 
effect monetary policy expectations. Surprises in macroeconomic news announcements have a 
larger effect on long-term monetary policy expectations (Table 13 column 2) than short ones 
(Table 13 column 3). As visible in Table 13 column 2, the elasticity of long-term monetary 
policy expectations to changes in non-farm payroll, retails sales, initial job claims, the University 
of Michigan consumer sentiment, the ISM, GDP and CPI are statistically significant at the 
conventional level of significance. As expected all variables have a positive sign except for job 
claims. If initial job claims are higher than expected, financial markets believe that interest rates 
should consequently decrease. 
According to Table 13 column 3, even if the coefficients of non-farm payroll, GDP, CPI, 
consumer confidence and new home sales surprises are positive and statistically significant at the 
conventional level of significance, their effects on short-term monetary policy expectations 
(target factor) are quite small. For instance, if the surprise index of changes in non-farm payroll 
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increases by one standard deviation, short-term monetary policy expectations rise by only 0.37 
basis points after the increase. These results suggest that when macroeconomic news indicators 
are greater than financial markets have previously forecasted, investors believe that interest rates 
should soon rise as the economy stabilizes.   
Finally, positive (negative) news has a positive (negative) effect on both long- and short-
term monetary policy expectations as visible in Table 13 columns 4 and 5, respectively. When 
news is positive (negative), investors expect the Federal Reserve to increase (decrease) federal 
funds rates in the short and long-term via expansionary (contractionary) open market operations. 
The elasticity of macroeconomic news surprises on monetary policy expectations are larger in 
absolute value for the path factor compared to the target one. These results suggest that long-
term monetary policy expectations are more sensitive to unexpected changes of macroeconomic 
indicators than short-term monetary policy expectations.  
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Table 13: The effect of macroeconomic indicator surprises on monetary policy expectations 
 Factors  
Variables Path Target Path Target 
Change in non-farm payroll 
surprise  
4.913*** 
(0.725) 
0.372* 
(0.219) 
  
  
Initial job Claims surprise -0.981*** 
(0.283) 
-0.0378 
(0.0396) 
  
  
GDP surprise 1.145** 
(0.582) 
0.154* 
(0.0883) 
  
   
ISM surprise 2.766*** 
(0.602) 
0.0827 
(0.339) 
  
   
CPI surprise 1.605* 
(0.870) 
0.297* 
(0.170) 
  
   
Consumer confidence index 
surprise 
0.419 
(0.343) 
0.0830** 
(0.0393) 
  
  
University of Michigan 
consumer sentiment index 
surprise 
0.647** 
(0.283) 
0.0348 
(0.0433) 
  
  
Retail sales surprise 2.681*** 
(0.549) 
0.0304 
(0.0494) 
  
   
New home sales surprise 0.406 
(0.349) 
0.0442* 
(0.0264) 
  
   
Positive News   5.638*** 
(0.697) 
0.374* 
(0.214)    
Constant 0.249 
(0.329) 
0.0724 
(0.0998) 
-2.766*** 
(0.470) 
-0.130 
(0.141)  
Observations 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,387 
Note: The path factor represents long-term monetary policy expectations; the target factor represents 
short-term monetary policy expectations.  
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Table 14 displays the elasticity of the return of the S&P500, 23 the VIX, the three-months 
bill, one- and ten-years Treasury note to changes in the target and path factors as indicated in 
equation (7). According to Table 14 Colum 2, changes in the target (path) factor have a negative 
(positive) effect on the returns of the S&P500 on days of FOMC announcements. The response 
of the return of the S&P500 to changes in long-term monetary policy expectations (path factor) 
on days of ISM is greater and statistically significant at the conventional level of significance 
compared to days of FOMC announcements. Similarly, the return of the S&P500 is greater in 
absolute value when there are changes in short-term monetary policy expectations and 
statistically significant at the conventional level of significance on days of non-farm payroll 
compared to days of FOMC announcements.  
On the other side, the VIX is not affected by changes in long-term monetary policy 
expectations, but only by short ones (Table 14 Colum 3). The VIX is more affected (absolute 
value) on days of non-farm payroll, GDP and CPI compared to days of FOMC announcement. 
On the contrary, the effect of changes in the target factor on the VIX on days when the 
University of Michigan consumer sentiment index is announced is smaller in absolute value 
compared to days of FOMC announcements. For instance, if the target factor increases by 25 
basis points, the VIX is 113 basis points lower on days when the University of Michigan 
consumer sentiment index is announced compared to the base group. 
Focusing now our attention to the Treasury yield curve, an increase in the target factor 
has a positive effect on the three month, one- and ten-years treasury notes as reported in Table 5 
column 4, 5, 6 respectively. Oppositely, changes in the path factor affect only the ten-years 
Treasury note. An increase in the target factor on days of changes in job-market claims have a 
                                                          
23
 The returns of the S&P500 are calculated as the following: ݎ = ܫ݊ሺ௣+ଵሻ − ܫ݊ሺ௣ሻ where r is the rate of return and P 
is the closing price of the day before the event was announced.  
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larger positive effect on the three-months Treasury bill compared to FOMC announcements.  
Changes in the target factor on days of ISM releases have a negative effect on the three-months 
Treasury bill compared to the same movement of the target factor on days of FOMC 
announcements. Similarly, changes in the target factor on days of initial job claims, retail sales 
and new home sales have a larger effect in, absolute value, on the one-year Treasury note 
compared to days of FOMC announcement. The ten-years bond is positively (negatively) 
affected by changes in the target factor on days of ISM (non-farm payroll, consumer confidence 
index and retail sales) announcement compared to days of FOMC announcements. The 
difference in signs, coefficient magnitudes and statistical significances depends on the 
importance that investors give to macroeconomic news release and how they effect their 
monetary policy expectations. The results discussed above signal that investors do change their 
monetary policy expectations on days when other macroeconomic indicators come out, and not 
only on days of FOMC. It also shows that the effect of these changes on financial markets is 
pronounced on days when several macroeconomic indicators come out compared to days of 
FOMC announcements. The latter suggests that financial markets do follow macroeconomic 
indicators and set their monetary policy expectations based on their forecast of the economy; 
when these forecast are not met, financial markets strongly react.   
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Table 14: The Effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of 
macroeconomic indicators announcements compared to FOMC announcement 
 
Variables S&P500 VIX 3 Month 
Note 
One-year 
Bill 
Ten-years 
Bond  
Path 0.019** 
(0.008) 
-2.203* 
(1.187) 
0.033 
(0.029) 
0.166*** 
(0.014) 
0.333*** 
(0.016)  
Target -0.011 
(0.026) 
-3.963 
(2.871) 
0.651*** 
(0.158) 
0.531*** 
(0.092) 
-0.103* 
(0.063)  
Change In Non-Farm 
Payroll (NP) 
-0.048 
(0.103) 
-22.580* 
(13.390) 
0.545* 
(0.319) 
0.014 
(0.228) 
-0.283 
(0.351) 
Initial Job Claims (JL) -0.076 
(0.069) 
13.380 
(9.515) 
-0.210 
(0.252) 
-0.281* 
(0.169) 
-0.616*** 
(0.204)  
GDP (GDP) 0.030 
(0.088) 
-21.400* 
(11.840) 
-0.037 
(0.278) 
0.049 
(0.179) 
-0.380 
(0.272)  
ISM (IMS) 0.015 
(0.102) 
19.070 
(14.310) 
1.301*** 
(0.418) 
0.533** 
(0.249) 
-0.093 
(0.307)  
CPI MoM (CPI) -0.075 
(0.103) 
-5.500 
(13.870) 
-0.673** 
(0.316) 
-0.222 
(0.201) 
-0.398 
(0.313)  
Consumer Confidence 
Index (CCI) 
0.024 
(0.152) 
-10.970 
(19.160) 
0.107 
(0.312) 
0.010 
(0.217) 
-0.300 
(0.269) 
U. Michigan Consumer 
Confidence Index (UM) 
-0.110 
(0.077) 
6.635 
(10.060) 
0.338 
(0.310) 
0.016 
(0.223) 
-0.720*** 
(0.236) 
Retails Sales MoM (RS) -0.125 
(0.121) 
22.930 
(17.430) 
-0.345 
(0.251) 
0.018 
(0.154) 
0.388 
(0.348)  
New Home Sales (NSH) 0.006 
(0.096) 
-5.565 
(11.320) 
0.646* 
(0.373) 
0.106 
(0.206) 
0.018 
(0.253)  
NP×Path -0.008 0.874 0.019 0.003 -0.049** 
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 (0.009) (1.162) (0.032) (0.020) (0.022) 
NP×Targer -0.048* 
(0.027) 
6.816*** 
(2.482) 
0.075 
(0.187) 
0.087 
(0.138) 
-0.175** 
(0.077)  
JL×Path 0.001 
(0.008) 
0.099 
(0.997) 
0.026 
(0.030) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
0.002 
(0.017)  
JL×Targer 0.030 
(0.025) 
-2.365 
(3.299) 
0.231* 
(0.129) 
0.171* 
(0.088) 
0.0277 
(0.064)  
GDP×Path -0.009 
(0.007) 
0.703 
(1.064) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.020) 
0.0172 
(0.020)  
GDP×Targer -0.087* 
(0.049) 
21.040** 
(9.249) 
0.035 
(0.314) 
-0.001 
(0.158) 
-0.230 
(0.155)  
ISM×Path 0.017* 
(0.010) 
-2.334 
(1.435) 
0.039 
(0.034) 
0.032 
(0.022) 
0.016 
(0.023)  
ISM×Targer 0.024 
(0.025) 
2.392 
(3.127) 
-0.529*** 
(0.153) 
-0.390*** 
(0.094) 
0.344*** 
(0.064)  
CPI×Path -0.011 
(0.010) 
0.389 
(1.127) 
0.009 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.039) 
CCI×Path 0.017 
(0.014) 
-2.828 
(1.912) 
0.0167 
(0.029) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
0.037 
(0.023)  
CCI×Targer -0.044 
(0.170) 
17.350 
(21.300) 
-0.410 
(0.282) 
-0.020 
(0.144) 
-0.230* 
(0.139)  
UM×Path -0.001 
(0.007) 
0.371 
(0.833) 
0.027 
(0.033) 
0.034 
(0.025) 
0.017 
(0.018)  
UM×Targer 0.037 
(0.025) 
-4.536* 
(2.383) 
-0.277 
(0.209) 
-0.121 
(0.159) 
0.116 
(0.081)  
RS×Path 0.005 
(0.010) 
0.248 
(1.379) 
0.022 
(0.027) 
-0.00537 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.024)  
RS×Targer 0.113 -12.560 0.482 0.350* -0.896** 
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 (0.135) (17.850) (0.402) (0.188) (0.368) 
NSH×Path -0.006 
(0.009) 
0.418 
(1.022) 
0.067 
(0.041) 
0.007 
(0.021) 
0.015 
(0.020)  
NSH×Targer 0.030 
(0.103) 
5.109 
(9.183) 
-0.489 
(0.577) 
0.561** 
(0.262) 
-0.315 
(0.238)  
Constant 0.115 
(0.070) 
-12.820 
(9.385) 
-0.638*** 
(0.230) 
-0.369** 
(0.149) 
0.476** 
(0.197)  
      
Observations 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,387 2,387 
Note: Newey-West (1987) Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Constant Standard errors in parenthesis 
(HAC, 3 lags). Results expressed in percentage for the S&P500 and in basis points for everything else.  
 
Table 17 in the Appendix displays the sum of the coefficients ߙଵ  and ߚ௞௝ , and ߙଶ  and ߚ௤௝ 
along with their joint test of statistical significance. The sum of ߙଵ  and ߚ௞௝ (of ߙଶ  and ߚ௤௝ሻ indicates the effect of changes in the path factor (target factor) on the return of the S&P500, 
VIX, three-months treasury bill, one-year treasury note and the ten-years treasury note for nine 
macroeconomic news releases and FOMC announcements.  
Changes in the path and target factors have a positive effect on all dependent variables 
except the VIX. This suggests that changes in short-term monetary policy expectations have a 
negative effect on the volatility of the S&P500 independently on the announcement. For 
example, if the target factor increases by 25 basis points on days when the latest values of the 
ISM index are released to the public, the VIX is expected to increase by 598 basis points.  
On the contrary, changes in short-term monetary policy expectations have a positive 
effect on the three-months Treasury bill and one-year Treasury note while it has diversified 
effects on the return of the S&P500, the VIX and the ten-years Treasury bond.  For instance, one 
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basis point change in the target factor on days of GDP announcements is expected to decrease 
the return S&P500 by 5.9 percent. Once again these later results suggest that when 
macroeconomic forecast are not met, investors change their short and long term monetary policy 
expectations, which untimely effect financial markets. These macroeconomic indicators are 
extremely important and often capable of shaking the stock and bond markets more than direct 
announcements on interest rates by Federal Reserve announcements.  
    4.3. Global recession 
In this section, I subsample the event studies to announcements made during the latest 
global financial crisis (December 2007-June 2009) as a robustness check. Just like Table 13, 
Table 15 reports the estimates of equations (5) and (6), but only for the events that happened 
during the latest financial crisis. According to the results, short-term monetary policy 
expectations, the target factor (columns 3 and 5, Table 15), are not affected by macroeconomic 
news surprises, while long-term monetary policy expectations, the path factors (columns 2 and 4, 
Table 15) are affected by unexpected released values of non-farm payroll, initial job claims, 
GDP, ISM and retail sales. This makes sense since short-term expectations of monetary policies 
and the state of the economy have not changed in the short run over this period of time. In order 
words, during the latest financial crisis financial markets were able to anticipate the short-term 
spam of the recession. On the other side, the end of the recession was uncertain. Indeed, changes 
in macroeconomic indicators (even if small) had a large effect on long-term expectations of 
monetary policies (path factor), but not on the short one (target factor).  
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Table 15. The effect of macroeconomic indicator surprises on monetary policy expectations 
during the latest global financial crisis 
 Factors  
Variables Path Target Path Target 
     
Change in non-farm Payroll Surprise  4.359*** 
(1.112) 
0.553 
(0.533) 
  
   
Initial job Claims surprise -
1.257*** 
(0.265) 
-0.0155 
(0.0363) 
  
  
GDP surprise 1.283** 
(0.526) 
0.225 
(0.166) 
  
  
ISM surprise 1.860*** 
(0.615) 
-0.445 
(0.557) 
  
  
CPI surprise 2.027 
(1.384) 
0.336 
(0.243) 
  
  
C.C.I. ** surprise  0.133 
(0.371) 
0.0563 
(0.0475) 
  
  
University of Michigan consumer 
sentiment index surprise 
0.599* 
(0.335) 
0.0457 
(0.0534) 
  
  
Retail sales surprise 2.469*** 
(0.555) 
-0.0798 
(0.0670) 
  
   
New home sales surprise -0.112 
(0.406) 
0.0157 
(0.0222) 
  
   
Positive News   4.716*** 
(0.949) 
-0.164 
(0.265)    
Constant 0.330 
(0.414) 
-0.0300 
(0.124) 
-2.101*** 
(0.631) 
0.0318 
(0.153) 
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Note: The path factor represents long-term monetary policy expectations; the target factor represents 
short-term monetary policy expectations. The event window is from December 2007 to June 2009. ** 
Consumer Confidence Index . 1,154 Total observations  
 
Estimates in Table 18 in the Appendix are very similar to the one reported in Table 17 in 
the Appendix. Changes in the path factor, when statistically significant at the conventional level 
of significance, have a positive effect on the return of the S&P500, the three-month Treasury bill, 
the one-year Treasury note and the ten-years Treasury note, independently on the announcement. 
On the contrary, changes in the target factor have a negative effect on the return of the S&P500 
and the ten-years treasury note (except for days when the ISM was announced), while it has a 
positive effect on the VIX, three-months treasury note and the one-year treasury bill. Overall, 
Changes in the path and target factor on all dependent variables are very small. Once again these 
results underline the importance of macroeconomic announcements and suggest that even during 
the latest recession financial markets were changing their monetary policy expectations based on 
the state of the economy. It is not surprising that changes in long term expectations had a larger 
effect on financial markets because of investor’s uncertainty.     
  5. Conclusions 
In this paper, similar to Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2004), I compute a principle 
component analysis using federal funds futures and the LIBOR to capture short and long-run 
financial markets’ monetary policy expectations in the United States. Differently from the 
current literature I use data on federal funds futures and eurodollar futures collected not only on 
days of FOMC meeting but also on days when other macroeconomic indicators are announced 
(namely change in non-farm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence 
index, University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sales). 
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These macroeconomic indicators are selected based on their Bloomberg relevance index, which 
identify investors most followed announcements on Bloomberg.  
Finally, after computing an event study I make three important contributions to the 
current literature: first, monetary policy expectations are affected by unexpected values of non-
farm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence index, University of 
Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sale; second, interest rates are 
expected to rise (fall) as a consequence of positive (negative) macroeconomic indicators and 
FOMC announcements; third, financial markets not only react to changes of short- and long-term 
monetary policy expectations on days of FOMC meetings, but also on days when other 
macroeconomic news are publically announced. 
These results suggest that investors adjust their monetary policy expectations based on 
the state of the economy and that financial markets are vulnerable to surprises in macroeconomic 
news as well as FOMC announcements. These results emphasize the importance of a transparent 
and well thought communication between the Federal Reserve and financial investors in order to 
promote stability and stimulate investments. 
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Chapter III: The Impact of China’s Economic Slowdown and United States’  New Trade 
Policy on both the United States and China 
 
1. Introduction  
International trade and globalization are shaping the face of a new global economy and 
redirecting the stream of cash flow to low cost production countries. In the past decades, China 
has become the heart of the global economy, importing and exporting a large range of products 
to and from the world. Therefore, governments and in particular financial markets around the 
globe strongly react when China shows signs of economic slowdown (e.g. August 2015 and 
January 2016).24 Given the exposure of China to other global economies, it is not surprising that 
policy institutions worldwide are constantly monitoring its economic development.  
According to Zilio (2016), China is a major U.S. trading partner (by far the United States' 
largest source of imported goods as well as an increasingly important destination for U.S.-made 
products). The United States’ other large trading partners have over the years also become more 
and more reliant on China's economy. For this reason, United States’ investors and policy 
makers are concerned about China's economic performance and its possible effect on the United 
States economy. According to the World Bank and the OECD data, China economic growth 
(year over year) has been slowing down over the decades. 25  A slowdown in China's economic 
activity could strongly affect international trade and deliver a negative shock to the United 
States. Additionally, upcoming trade reforms in the United States (e.g. the border-adjustment 
tax) could have a strong impact on the trade dynamics between China and the United States.  
                                                          
24
 Financial markets around the globe reacted strongly in August 2015, when China started showing signs of 
economic slowdown. Financial markets weakened again in January 2016, when Chinese stocks fell dramatically 
after further devaluation of the Yuan. 
25
 Going from its highest growth rate of 6.4 percent in 1965 to its lowest (-1.7 percent) in 2009, during the global 
financial crisis, to finally settle between 2-3 percent growth rate since 2011. 
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Clearly, trade is not the only channel through which China's slowdown could hold back 
economic growth in the U.S. A number of other dynamic mechanisms (including financial 
market volatility, consumer and business confidence, and exchange rates) might also affect 
American growth. This is why dynamic general equilibrium models are a better fit to attempt to 
explain the behavior of supply, demand, and prices in a whole economy with several or many 
interacting markets.  
In this paper I investigate the effects of a negative productivity shock in China and two 
simultaneous trade shocks in the United States and China using a stochastic general equilibrium 
model previously introduced by Ghironi & Melitz (2005). 26  
In general, stochastic growth models for closed and open economies account for the 
magnitude of fluctuations, relative to output, in consumption and investment and the correlations 
of these fluctuations with output. In the Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model, in open economies, like 
the United Sates, their demand and supply are not only affected by their internal production. This 
also means that risks and shocks are shared across countries (both consumption risk and 
investment risk). The vast majority of international macroeconomic models take the pattern of 
international trade and the structure of markets for goods and factors of production as given. The 
determinants of such trade patterns are analyzed within methodologically distinct models that are 
generally limited to comparisons of long-run positions or growth dynamics after changes in 
trade’s determinants. Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model fully address this weakness by including 
the determinants and evolution of trade patterns in their model. In this case, firms face sunk entry 
cost and uncertainty when making an irreversible decision to enter the domestic market. Firm’s 
productivity and costs change over time, but only a small group of firms serve the international 
                                                          
26
 DSGE models study how the economy evolves over time. They are called stochastic when they take into account 
the fact that the economy is affected by random shocks such as technological change and price fluctuations.  
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market (the most productive ones). Indeed, this microeconomic structure endogenously 
determines the production and consumption of each country and it is affected by exogenous 
shocks to aggregate productivity, entry and trade.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 looks at the literature review on both static and 
stochastic equilibrium models. Section 3 discusses the motivation behind the selection of shocks 
used in this paper. Section 4 summarizes Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model including their 
equilibrium, steady state conditions and parameters. Section 5 discusses the impulse response 
functions. Finally, Section 6 concludes.   
2. Literature review  
In this section, I discuss the current literature on the static and dynamic effects of a 
country shock within and across its borders (focusing on the United States and China).  
To the best of my knowledge, there are only a few studies that look at the effect of fast 
growing countries slowing down the global economy (Ben-David & Papell, 1998; Eichengreen, 
Park, & Shin, 2011; Fernald, Edison, & Loungani, 1999; Pritchett, 2000; Reddy & Minoiu, 
2009). Ben-David and Papell (1998) examine a sample of 74 advanced and developing countries 
spanning the period 1950-1990 and look for statistically significant breaks in time series for GDP 
growth rates. They find that while most industrialized countries experienced postwar growth 
slowdowns in the early 1970s, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom did not. 
Developing countries -in particular Latin American countries- tended to experience much more 
severe slowdowns which occurred nearly a decade after the developing countries. Using 
international data from 1957 to 2013, Eichengreen, Park, & Shin (2011) conclude that rapidly 
growing economies slow down significantly (the growth rate downshifts by at least 2 percentage 
points) when their per capita incomes reach around $17,000. Among their more provocative 
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findings is that growth slowdowns are more likely in countries that maintain undervalued real 
exchange rates (as if countries with undervalued currencies have less incentive to move up the 
technological ladder out of unskilled-labor intensive, low-value-added sectors and thus find it 
more difficult to sustain rapid growth). Fernald, Edison, & Loungani (1999) assess the linkages 
between China and the rest of emerging Asia, arguing that the devaluation of the yen in 1994 
contributed to the Asian financial crisis. The transmission of this shock took the following path: 
if China’s exchange rate depreciates, Chinese exports become more competitive, exceeding the 
export rate of other Asian economies. This causes a reduction in capital inflows, which 
diminishes job creation and slows down the Chinese economy.  
Pritchett (2000) examines cases of developing countries where growth is sustained for a 
period and then stagnates or collapses. He compares what happens to developed and developing 
countries. He concludes that volatility in growth is much greater in developing countries than in 
developed ones. In a similar study by Reddy and Miniou (2009), stagnation is found to be more 
prevalent in poor, conflict ridden, commodity-exporting countries than in developed countries.  
The majority of the models described above are static and do not allow the researcher to 
fully control for intertemporal, cross-country shocks transmission. To solve this issue, over the 
past decade there has been remarkable progress precisely estimating dynamic models (mainly 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models).  
Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1992) extend the existing theory on economic growth to a 
competitive model of a world economy with a single homogeneous good and internationally 
immobile labor.  They conclude that poor but quickly growing countries borrow less from richer, 
more slowly growing countries than the theory suggests. Ghironi & Melitz (2005) bridge the gap 
between international macroeconomics and trade theory using Melitz’s (2003) model of trade 
  
78 
with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms as the microeconomic underpinning of a 
two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of international trade. They provide 
an explanation of why more productive economies, or less regulated ones (phenomena that affect 
all firms in the economy) exhibit higher average prices relative to their trading partners (Harrod-
Balassa- Samuelson effect). Furthermore, they show that, with fully flexible prices, deviations 
from production possibility frontier display substantial endogenous persistence in response to 
transitory aggregate shocks. The Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model is often used in the DSGE 
literature (Arkolakis, Costinot, & Rodríguez-Clare, 2012; Atkeson & Burstein, 2008; Backus et 
al., 1992; Eaton, Kortum, & Kramarz, 2011; Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010; Shapiro & Mandelman, 
2016) because it closely matches several moments of U.S. and international business cycles. 
Given the increasing attention that investors and policy makers are giving to China’s 
development, DSGE models that focus solely on the Chinese economy have been increasing over 
time (Bin, 2008; Chen, Funke, & Paetz, 2012; Zhang, 2009). Bin (2008) builds a DSGE model 
with financial-accelerator for monetary policy analysis and applies the Bayesian technique to 
account for China’s business cycle. Chen, Funke & Paets (2012) develops a New Keynesian 
DSGE model to capture China’s unconventional monetary policy toolkit. They find that credit 
quotas are important as the interest-rate corridor distorts the efficient reactions of the economy. 
Zhang (2009) explores two monetary policy rules- the money supply (quantity) rule and interest 
rate (price) rule in his DSGE model specifically designed to reflect the Chinese economy. The 
empirical results seem to indicate that the price rule is likely to be more effective in managing 
the price than the quantity rule, favoring the government’s intention of liberalizing interest rates 
and making more active use of the price instrument. According to Chen at al. (2012), China’s 
monetary policy approach has three main features. First, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) 
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regulates the policy rate, the retail lending rate and the deposit rate. Second, they use non-market 
tools such as loan quotas and window guidance to directly affect depositary institutions landing 
strategies. Third, they set the required reserve ratio. Considering that monetary policy instability 
may cause indeterminacy of the macroeconomic equilibrium, their paper derives the boundary 
condition between determinacy and indeterminacy in a small open economy DSGE model. They 
then use this model to investigate China's monetary policy and macroeconomic fluctuations 
under indeterminacy during the period from 1992 to 2011. The empirical results show that the 
nominal interest rate reacts not only to inflation and output gap, but also to the changes in their 
currency exchange rate. Moreover, the indeterminacy in the macro-dynamics indicates the 
instability in China's monetary policy stems from two sources- the sunspot shock and the 
indeterminate propagation of fundamental shocks. In addition, they find that the monetary policy 
shock affects macroeconomic dynamics significantly in the short run. While in the long run it 
only influences nominal variables, such as inflation and the exchange rate, but not the real 
output.  
Since the aim of this paper is to shed light on the effect of China’s economic slowdown 
on the US economy, I use Ghironi & Melitz’s (2005) DSGE model. Their model is a stochastic 
general equilibrium two-country model of trade and macroeconomic dynamics. This paper 
differs from the literature because it specifically looks at the case of the United States and China. 
Because the results highlight the dynamic effect of two current and highly discussed policy 
issues in the United States (namely China’s economic growth slow down and the border-
adjustment tax), this paper is particularly relevant to policy makers.  
3. Motivation 
China’s economic slowdown has been at the center of the attention of U.S. policymakers 
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and investors, who are concerned about how China’s economic performance could affect the 
United States economy. For example, in the minutes of its June 14–15, 2016 meeting, the 
Federal Open Market Committee stated, "continued uncertainty regarding the outlook for China's 
foreign exchange policy and the relatively high levels of debt in China and some other EMEs 
[emerging market economies] represented appreciable risks to global financial stability and 
economic performance". In order to investigate this issue I look at the dynamic effect of a 
negative technological shock to China’s productivity and its transmission to the United States 
using Ghironi & Melitz (2005)’s DSGE model.  
Regarding the trade policy, policy makers (mostly those in the Republican Party) have 
been pushing to replace America’s current tax on corporate profits with a system that raises the 
costs of imports while helping exports by adding a tax on imports and a subsidy on exports. 
Companies currently deduct practically all of their costs, including imports, from their sales 
revenue and then pay taxes on the remaining profits. This new policy, known as a border-
adjustment tax, essentially involves ending the deductibility of imports so that they would be 
taxed on their worldwide income. At the same time, profits on exports would no longer be taxed, 
and the overall tax rate would be cut. Many countries, but not the United States already have a 
form of national sales tax on imports and exports are exempt from value-added taxes. Currently 
China’s average tariffs are about three times as high as those in the United States (New York 
Times, 2017). Lower American trade barriers have helped China to increase exports to the 
United States, while importing fairly little from the U.S.. In order to investigate this issue I look 
at the effect of a positive shock in U.S. trade costs (subsidy) and a negative shock in China’s 
trade costs (tariff) to both the United States and China using Ghironi & Melitz (2005) DSGE 
model.  
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3. The model  
3.1. Summary of the model and the equilibrium conditions  
Once again, the model used in this paper is a stochastic, general equilibrium, two-country 
model of trade and macroeconomic dynamics developed by Ghironi & Melitz (2005).  DSGE 
models have a simple structure, built around three interrelated blocks: a demand block, a supply 
block, and a monetary policy equation.  A key advantage of DSGE models is that they share core 
assumptions on the behavior of households and firms, which makes them easily accessible to 
modify details that are relevant to address the question at hand. The equations that define these 
blocks derive from microfoundations and explicit assumptions about the behavior of the main 
economic actors in the economy (namely households, firms, and the government). These agents 
interact in markets that clear every period, which leads to the “general equilibrium” feature of the 
models.  
The Ghironi & Melitz (2005) model has the advantage of inclusion international trade 
patterns into the standard DSGE model. Their model has the following interesting features: 
productivity differs across individual; there are monopolistically competitive firms in each 
country; firms face a sunk entry cost in the domestic market, both fixed, and per-unit export 
costs; only relatively more productive firms export (the export cutoff defines the level of 
productivity); firms face some initial uncertainty concerning their future productivity when 
making an irreversible investment to enter the domestic market. Furthermore, in their model 
exogenous shocks (such as aggregate productivity shocks, changes in domestic market 
regulation, and changes in trade policy) alter the composition of consumption baskets across 
countries over time by pushing firms into and out of the market. Differently from the other 
models, Ghironi & Melitz’s (2005) model generates endogenously persistent deviations from the 
  
82 
production possibility frontier that would not exist absent with heterogeneous firms. Also their 
model predicts that more productive economies, or less regulated ones, exhibit higher average 
prices relative to their trading partners. This real exchange rate appreciation is driven by entry 
and endogenous non-tradedness, the two key new features of Ghironi & Melitz’s (2005) model 
setup. 27 
 Table 16 in the Appendix reports the equilibrium conditions of Ghironi & Melitz (2005) 
DSGE model. The variables that strictly correspond to the home country (the United States) do 
not have an asterisk on top. The variables that strictly correspond to foreign country (China) do 
have an asterisk on top. Table 1 summarizes the nineteen endogenous variables of the model: ݓ௧ (real wage in the home country), ݓ௧∗(real wage in the foreign country), ݀̃௧ (the average firm 
profit of home producers’ domestic sales), ݀̃௧∗(the average firm profit of foreign producers’ 
domestic sales),  ாܰ,௧(the number of firms entering the home market), ாܰ,௧∗ (the number firm 
entering the foreign market), ̃ݖ𝑋,௧(export cut off in the home country), ̃ݖ𝑋,௧∗  (export cut off in the 
foreign country), ஽ܰ,௧(the number of domestic firms selling only in the home country), ஽ܰ,௧∗ (the 
number of domestic firms selling only in the foreign country), ?ܰ?,௧ (the number of exporter firms 
in the home country), ?ܰ?,௧∗ (the number of exporter firms in the foreign country), ݎ௧ (the risk-free 
interest rate in the home country), ݎ௧∗ (the risk-free interest rate in the foreign country), ̃ݒ௧ (the 
entry cost in the home country), ̃ݒ௧∗ (the entry cost in the foreign country), ܥ௧ (the household 
consumption in the home country), ܥ௧∗(the household consumption in the foreign country), ܳ௧ 
(the exchange rate between the two countries, from the perspective of the home country). 
Additionally the model includes eight exogenous variables: the aggregate productivities ܼ௧ and ܼ௧∗, and several policy variables, ா݂,௧(sunkentry cost in the home country), ா݂,௧∗  (sunk entry cost in 
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 For more details on the structure of the DSGE model please see Ghironi & Melitz (2005).  
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the foreign country), ?݂?,௧(fixed trade costs in the home country), ?݂?,௧∗  (fixed trade costs in the 
foreign country), 𝜏௧(trade cost in the home country/iceberg cost), 𝜏௧∗(trade cost in the foreign 
country/ iceberg cost). Changes in ா݂,௧, ா݂,௧∗  can be interpreted as changes in market regulation 
facing a country’s firms in the respective domestic markets. Changes in ?݂?,௧, ?݂?,௧∗ , 𝜏௧ and 𝜏௧∗ 
represent changes in trade policy.  
3.2. Calibration  
In the following section, I summarize the calibration used in this paper. I adopt the same 
calibration as Ghironi & Melitz (2005) since they were able to match numerous moments of the 
United States and international business cycle. In thus paper, differently from Ghironi & Melitz’s 
(2005), China’s trade iceberg costs are larger then (and not equal to) the United States once in 
order to reflect the current trade patterns between China and the United Sates (China has higher 
trade costs).  
The discount factor, ȕ, is 0.99 for the both countries, while the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is Ȗ is equal to 2.28 Periods are interpreted as quarters. The exogenous exit shock, δ is 
0.25 to match the U.S. empirical level of 10 percent job destruction per year. The elasticity of 
substitution across goods (θ) is 3.8 in order to fit the U.S. plant and macro trade data from 
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003). The choice of θ = 3.8 then implies k = 3.4 (this 
satisfies the requirement k>θ −1). Export firms in the United States have a trade iceberg cost29 
(τ) of 1.5 to reflect the trade cost difference reported in the new York Times’s article titles 
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 Both standard chooses for business cycle models.  
29
 Iceberg trade costs mean that for each good that is exported a certain fraction melts away during the trading 
process as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean. The model yields a simple micro-founded gravity equation 
from which the implied international trade costs can be inferred. This indirect approach results in a comprehensive 
measure of trade barriers that is both intuitive and easy to compute. For each good shipped, 1/(1 + τ ) goods arrive at 
destination. The iceberg costs is an exogenous cost to transportation that diminishes over time. Variation in pricing 
across export markets is determined entirely by iceberg trade cost factor.  
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“Building Trade barriers” (New York Times, 2017). In the United States, fixed trade costs (fx)  
equals 23.5 percent of the pre-period to match the proportion of exporting plants of 21 percent as 
reported by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum (2003). China’s trade iceberg cost (τ*) is set to be 
1.3. The sunk cost in both countries, (fE) is set to one. The calibration implies that on average, 
exporters in the U.S. are 65.4 percent more productive than importers. The steady-state share of 
expenditure on nontraded domestic goods is 0.78.  
 3.3. Impulse responses 
Figure I shows the impulse responses (percent deviations from steady state) to a 
permanent 1 percent decrease in China’s productivity while Figure II shows the impulse 
responses to a permanent 20 percent decrease in the trade iceberg costs of the United States and a 
permanent 20 percent increase in trade iceberg costs for China. The number of quarters after the 
shock is on the horizontal axis.  
In Figure I, a negative technology shock in China results in a less attractive domestic 
market for Chinese producers. Consequently, the number of new American firms entering the 
United States increases while the number of new Chinese firms entering in China decreases. This 
translates into a permanently higher number of producers in the United States and in contrast a 
permanently lower number of producers in China. In other words, the number of new entrant 
firms (Ne) represents the United States consumer investments, which increases at first, adding 
firms to the stock of already producing firms (Nd). In China, the immediate impact of the 
productivity shock reduces the supply of Chinese effective labor units relative to foreign. The 
labor shortage bids up the price of Chinese labor in the United States in the short run, which 
increases the Chinese export cutoff (zx*). The US export cutoff also increases due to a temporary 
decline in foreign demand. Therefore, both countries experience a reduction in the number of 
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exporters (Ne, Ne*). After the initial shock to China’s productivity, the number of new entrant 
firms continues to decrease, reversing the effect of the initial appreciation of labor in the United 
States. Because enjoy less variety of consumption goods. As expected, the dollar depreciates at 
first because of an increase in the prices of Chinese goods (decrease in supply). However, in the 
long run the exchange rate appreciates as a result of US increasingly substituting away Chinese made 
goods.  
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Figure 3:  Response to a Permanent Negative shock on China’s Productivity (Z)  
 
 
Note: C is consumption in the United States. C* is consumption in China. Ne is the number of entry firms 
in the United States. Ne* is the number of entry firms in China. Nd is the number of total firms in the 
United States. Nd* is the number of total firms in China. Nx is the number of exporting firms in the 
United States. Nx* is the number of exporting firms in China. Zx is the export cut off level in the United 
States. Zx* is the export cut off level in the China. ToL is the effectiveness of the labor market in the 
United States compared to China’s workers. QCPI is the exchange rate (dollars/Yean).  
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Figure 4: Response to a Permanent Shock on both China and the United States’ iceberg cost of 
trade (τ, τ*) on both economies 
 
 
 
Note: C is consumption in the United States. C* is consumption in China. Ne is the number of entry firms 
in the United States. Ne* is the number of entry firms in China. Nd is the number of total firms in the 
United States. Nd* is the number of total firms in China. Nx is the number of exporting firms in the 
United States. Nx* is the number of exporting firms in China. Zx is the export cut off level in the United 
States. Zx* is the export cut off level in the China. ToL is the effectiveness of the labor market in the 
United States compared to China and also an approximation of the exchange rate. QCPI is the exchange 
rate (dollars/Yean). Export is U.S. exports. Imports is U.S. Imports.  
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Figure II looks at the effect of a subsidy on US exports while simultaneously imposing a 
tariff on its imports. First, a tariff on Chinese goods causes Chinese prices to decline in order to 
compete with American products. Less firms will enter China’s market (Ne*), which 
permanently reduces the number of overall firms (Nd*). On the contrary, U.S. prices will 
increase causing the dollar to appreciate. Most of the appreciation of the U.S. dollar is driven by 
a reduction of Chinese prices and an increase in the prices of American goods, causing the 
exchange rate to decrease.30 This results in a permanent depreciation of China’s labor that leads 
to a decrease in the home export cutoff, allowing a larger number of Chinese firms to export. The 
dollar appreciation decrease in the number of exporting firms in the United States and a 
corresponding increase in the number of exporting firms in China. The opposite happens in the 
United States so that American firms need to be more productive than they were before the shock 
in order to able to export. As a result, American consumers are worse off since there is less 
variety (due to comparative advantage). Because of this new trade policy, both total imports and 
exports in the United States decrease by approximately 8 percent (please note that if the 
permanent trade shocks were to be smaller, the decrease in imports and exports would have been 
lower as well).  
4. Conclusions 
This paper uses a stochastic general equilibrium model previously introduced by Ghironi 
& Melitz (2005) to investigate a relevant international issue and an upcoming United States’ 
trade policy (namely, China economic slowdown and the United States’ proposed Border 
Adjustment Tax).  
In the first case, China is strongly affected by a permanent shock on its productivity. 
                                                          
30
 Please note that the real exchange rate is calculated as the following: ܳ௧ = ߝ௧ ௧ܲ∗/ ௧ܲ. Here ߝ௧ is the nominal 
exchange rate, ௧ܲ∗ is the price of Chinese goods at time t, ௧ܲ and is the price of U.S. goods at time t.  
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American firms enter into the United States market to offset the reduction in exports of Chinese 
products, which decreases consumption (resources are not efficiently allocated). American 
consumers are worst off as the variety of goods available decreases. 
In the second case, a tariff on imports and a subsidy on exports leave consumers in the 
United Sates (China) slightly worst (better) off after the trade policy is implemented. The labor 
market in China is damaged by this new trade policy. Simultaneously, fewer firms enter the 
Chinese market, which leads to an increase in consumer prices in the United States.  
To conclude, a reduction in China’s productivity has a positive effect on American firms 
and labor while it has a negative effect on exports and consumption. Overall investors and policy 
makers should not fear a possible contraction in China’s economic growth. Finally, a Border 
Adjustment Tax of 20 percent increase the U.S. dollar of approximately 20 percent (relative to 
the world basket of currencies) which would fully offset the tax paid by importers and the 
subsidy received by exporters. This policy is fully worthy of consideration, but also suffers from 
several implementation risks (such as higher prices of goods for American consumers and less 
verity).  
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Conclusions  
 In the first chapter I conclude that the resulting CIT-rate differentials among 
countries is leading to BEPS as MNEs shift profits from affiliates located in high CIT-rate 
countries to affiliates located in low CIT rate countries to minimize their aggregate tax liabilities 
thus increasing their worldwide after-tax profits. This chapter seeks to gauge the effect of CIT-
rate differentials among countries on BEPS. I improve upon the existing literature by accounting 
for whether countries actually enforce their transfer-pricing rules and when they have the 
incentive to do so because of the tax incentive facing domestic affiliates of MNEs. I report strong 
evidence that correctly specifying the model of reported profits in the manner prescribed in this 
paper has important implications for the correct choice of function form and a substantial effect 
on the estimated semi-elasticities of reported profits. The main results are the following: the 
estimated semi-elasticity of BEPS is equal to -3.5, meaning that a 10% increase in the tax rate 
differential between countries results in a 35% decrease in reported earnings in the high tax 
country; when there is an increase in the incentive for outbound profit shifting, firms that are 
located in countries with strict anti-avoidance rules report 32% more profits than otherwise; 
when there is an increase in the incentive for inbound profit shifting, firms with ultimate owners 
located in countries with strict anti-avoidance rules report 10% less profits than otherwise. I also 
conduct a policy simulation to illustrate the practical importance to tax policy analysis. I use my 
preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as an estimate of this semi-
elasticity using a state-of-the-art but misspecified model to conduct the policy simulation. This 
exercise shows that using estimates of the semi-elasticities from a correctly specified model (that 
takes into account enforcement) has a substantial effect on the estimated tax revenue effect of the 
proposed reform. Future reaserch should apply the same methodology used in this paper for 
developing coutries for which very little has been done.  
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In the second chapter of my dissertation, I compute a principle component analysis using 
federal funds futures and the LIBOR to capture short and long-run financial markets’ monetary 
policy expectations in the United States. Differently from the current literature I use data on 
federal funds futures and eurodollar futures collected not only on days of FOMC meeting but 
also on days when other macroeconomic indicators are announced (namely change in non-farm 
payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence index, University of Michigan 
consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sales). These macroeconomic indicators 
are selected based on their Bloomberg relevance index, which identify investors most followed 
announcements on Bloomberg. After computing an event study I make three important 
contributions to the current literature: first, monetary policy expectations are affected by 
unexpected values of non-farm payroll, initial job claims, GDP, ISM, CPI, consumer confidence 
index, University of Michigan consumer sentiment index, retails sales and new home sale; 
second, interest rates are expected to rise (fall) as a consequence of positive (negative) 
macroeconomic indicators and FOMC announcements; third, financial markets not only react to 
changes of short- and long-term monetary policy expectations on days of FOMC meetings, but 
also on days when other macroeconomic news are publically announced. As previously 
discussed, these results suggest that investors adjust their monetary policy expectations based on 
the state of the economy and that financial markets are vulnerable to surprises in macroeconomic 
news as well as FOMC announcements. These results emphasize the importance of a transparent 
and well thought communication between the Federal Reserve and financial investors in order to 
promote stability and stimulate investments. Future reaserch should extend the methodology 
used in this paper to minutes data on stock markets.  
In the last chapter,  I use a stochastic general equilibrium model previously introduced by 
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Ghironi & Melitz (2005) to investigate a relevant international issue and an upcoming United 
States’ trade policy (namely, China economic slowdown and the United States’ proposed Border 
Adjustment Tax). In the first case, China is strongly affected by a permanent shock on its 
productivity. American firms enter into the United States market to offset the reduction in 
exports of Chinese products, which decreases consumption (resources are not efficiently 
allocated). American consumers are worst off as the variety of goods available decreases. In the 
second case, a tariff on imports and a subsidy on exports leave consumers in the United Sates 
(China) slightly worst (better) off after the trade policy is implemented. The labor market in 
China is damaged by this new trade policy. Simultaneously, fewer firms enter the Chinese 
market, which leads to an increase in consumer prices in the United States. To conclude, a 
reduction in China’s productivity has a positive effect on American firms and labor while it has a 
negative effect on exports and consumption. Overall investors and policy makers should not fear 
a possible contraction in China’s economic growth. Finally, a Border Adjustment Tax of 20 
percent increase the U.S. dollar of approximately 20 percent (relative to the world basket of 
currencies) which would fully offset the tax paid by importers and the subsidy received by 
exporters. This policy is fully worthy of consideration, but also suffers from several 
implementation risks (such as higher prices of goods for American consumers and less verity).  
Future research should calibrate the DSGE model used in this paper to better represent China and 
the United States economic relationship (in this paper I used the standard calibration).  
 
  
93 
Appendix  
Table 16: Model Summary 
 
Endogenous variables Equilibrium Equation 
Price Indexes  ஽ܰ,௧(ߩ ̃஽,௧)ଵ−𝜃 + ?ܰ?,௧(ߩ ̃𝑋,௧∗ )ଵ−𝜃 = ͳ 
஽ܰ,௧∗ (ߩ ̃஽,௧)ଵ−𝜃 + ?ܰ?,௧∗ (ߩ ̃𝑋,௧∗ )ଵ−𝜃 = ͳ 
Profits  ݀̃௧ = ݀̃஽,௧∗ + ?ܰ?,௧∗஽ܰ,௧∗  ݀̃𝑋,௧∗  ݀̃௧∗ = ݀̃஽,௧∗ + ?ܰ?,௧∗஽ܰ,௧∗  ݀̃𝑋,௧∗  
Free entry  ̃ݒ௧ = ݓ௧ ா݂,௧ܼ௧  ̃ݒ௧∗ = ݓ௧∗ ா݂,௧∗ܼ௧  
Zero-profit export 
cutoffs 
݀̃𝑋,௧ = ݓ௧ ?݂?,௧ܼ௧  ߠ − ͳ݇ − ሺߠ − ͳሻ ݀̃𝑋,௧∗ = ݓ௧∗ ?݂?,௧∗ܼ௧∗  ߠ − ͳ݇ − ሺߠ − ͳሻ 
Share of exporting firms ௫ܰ,௧஽ܰ,௧ = ሺݖ௠௜௡ሻ௞(̃ݖ𝑋,௧)−௞ [ ݇݇ − ሺߠ − ͳሻ]௞/ሺ𝜃−ଵሻ 
 ௫ܰ,௧∗஽ܰ,௧∗ = ሺݖ௠௜௡ሻ௞(̃ݖ𝑋,௧∗ )−௞ [ ݇݇ − ሺߠ − ͳሻ]௞/ሺ𝜃−ଵሻ 
Number of firms ஽ܰ,௧ = ሺͳ − ߜሻ( ஽ܰ,௧−ଵ + ாܰ,௧−ଵ) 
஽ܰ,௧∗ = ሺͳ − ߜሻ( ஽ܰ,௧−ଵ∗ + ாܰ,௧−ଵ∗ ) 
Euler equation (bonds) (ܥ௧ )−ఊ = ߚሺͳ + ݎ௧+ଵሻܧ௧[ሺܥ௧+ଵሻ−ఊ] ሺܥ௧∗ሻ−ఊ = ߚሺͳ + ݎ௧+ଵ∗ ሻܧ௧[ሺܥ௧+ଵ∗ ሻ−ఊ] 
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Euler Equation (shares) ̃ݒ௧ = ߚሺͳ − ߜሻܧ௧ [ቆܥ௧+ଵܥ௧ ቇ−ఊ ቀ(̃ݒ௧+ଵ + ݀̃௧+ଵ)ቁ] 
 ̃ݒ௧∗ = ߚሺͳ − ߜሻܧ௧ [(ܥ௧+ଵ∗ܥ௧ )−ఊ (̃ݒ௧+ଵ∗ + ݀̃௧+ଵ∗ )] 
Aggregate Accounting  ܥ௧ = ݓ௧ܮ + ஽ܰ,௧݀̃௧ − ாܰ,௧ݒ௧  
 ܥ௧∗ = ݓ௧ܮ + ஽ܰ,௧݀̃௧ − ாܰ,௧ݒ௧  
Balanced Trade  ܳ௧ ?ܰ?,௧(̃ߩ𝑋,௧)ଵ−𝜃ܥ௧∗ = ?ܰ?,௧∗ (̃ߩ𝑁,௧∗ )ଵ−𝜃ܥ௧ 
Source: Ghironi &Melize (2005). For the explanation of the parameters please see the text or Ghironi 
&Melize (2005)’s paper.  
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Table 17: The Effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of macroeconomic indicators announcements 
Days  S&P500 VIX Three-months  
Treasury Note 
One-year  
Treasury Bill 
Ten-years  
Treasury Bond 
Path Target Path Target Path Target Path Target Path Target 
Change In Non-Farm 
Payroll  
0.010*** -0.059* -1.328*** 2.852 0.052*** 0.726*** 0.169*** 0.619*** 0.284*** -0.278*** 
Initial Job Claims 0.019*** 0.018 -2.102*** -6.327 0.059*** 0.882*** 0.193*** 0.703*** 0.336*** -0.076 
GDP 0.009 -0.097* -1.500 17.077* 0.014 0.686** 0.141*** 0.531*** 0.350*** -0.334** 
ISM 0.036*** 0.013 -4.537*** -1.570 0.072*** 0.122*** 0.198*** 0.141*** 0.349*** 0.241*** 
CPI  0.007 -0.047 -1.813* 5.824*** 0.041 0.988** 0.152*** 0.659** 0.336*** -.164* 
C.C.I. ** 0.035*** -0.055 -5.030*** 13.384 0.050*** 0.241 0.155*** 0.512*** 0.370*** -0.334*** 
U. Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index 
0.018*** 0.026 -1.831* -8.499* 0.060** 0.374 0.200*** 0.410** 0.350*** 0.012 
Retails Sales  0.019* 0.102 -1.954* -16.520* 0.056*** 1.133*** 0.161*** 0.881*** 0.332*** -1.000*** 
New Home Sales  0.013 0.019 -1.784* 1.146 0.100*** 0.162 0.172*** 1.092*** 0.349*** -0.418* 
FOMC  0.018** -0.011 -2.202* -3.962 -0.014 0.680*** 0.166*** 0.531*** 0.333*** -0.103** 
Note: Newey-West (1987) Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Constant Standard errors in parenthesis (HAC, 3 lags). Results expressed in 
percentage for the S&P500 and VIX and in basis points for treasury bill and notes. The path factor represents long-term monetary policy 
expectations; the target factor represents short-term monetary policy expectations. ** Consumer Confidence Index  
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Table 18: The Effect of monetary policy expectations on financial markets on days of macroeconomic news announcements during the 
latest global financial crisis 
Days  S&P500 VIX Three-months  
Treasury Note 
One-year  
Treasury Bill 
Ten-years  
Treasury Bond 
Path Target Path Target Path Target Path Target Path Target 
Change In Non-Farm 
Payroll  
0.016* -0.023 -1.599** 6.613 0.037*** 0.504 0.112*** 0.217 0.272*** -0.218 
Initial Job Claims 0.023* 0.088 -2.443** -12.687 0.040** 0.916 0.157*** 0.699*** 0.352*** -0.295 
GDP 0.010 -0.148** -0.683 27.263** -0.014 0.459 0.081*** 0.475*** 0.398*** -0.337** 
ISM  0.071*** 0.013 -6.476*** 2.301 0.028 0.123 0.136*** 0.116* 0.418*** 0.301*** 
CPI  0.023 -0.239** -2.901* 25.000** -0.015 0.122 0.096*** 0.260 0.399*** -0.537** 
C.C.I. ** 0.054*** -0.174 -7.99*** 26.809 0.018 -0.007 0.112*** 0.501*** 0.416*** -0.710*** 
U. Michigan Consumer 
Sentiment Index  
0.036*** 0.091 -3.692** -35.932*** 0.005 0.875* 0.156*** 1.047 0.366*** -0.426** 
Retails Sales 0.026* 0.053 -3.554 -8.953* 0.051 1.111* 0.162*** 0.865** 0.314*** -2.510*** 
New Home Sales 0.002 -0.130 -1.262 7.729 0.033 -0.142 0.109*** 0.500 0.375*** -1.200* 
FOMC  0.029** 0.032 -3.202 -13.418*** .033 0.651*** 0.132*** 0.668*** 0.362*** -0.258* 
Note: Note: Newey-West (1987) Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Constant Standard errors in parenthesis (HAC, 3 lags). Results expressed 
in percentage for the S&P500 and VIX and in basis points for treasury bill and notes. The path factor represents long-term monetary policy 
expectations; the target factor represents short-term monetary policy expectations. The event window is from December 2007 to June 2010.          
** Consumer Confidence Index. 
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